

Study Guide

AUPSC

The African Union
Peace and Security
Council



Agenda:
Addressing the
Situation in Mali

Freeze Date: April 7 2012

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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

You've got to be able to survive, because it's a cold world out here. If you ain't got no protection or no way to make it, you're just another statistic.

— Calvin Cordozar Broadus Jr.

Esteemed delegates,

It is with a profound sense of anticipation that we convene you here for the African Union Peace and Security Council simulation. The crisis on our agenda today is that within the Republic of Mali. The freeze date is set at 7 April 2012, 0900 hours, precisely twelve hours after the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad declared an independent state in the north, and less than twenty-four hours after the Ouagadougou Framework Agreement was signed. You convene today in a room whose air still vibrates with the fresh ink of documents that now define the fate of an entire region.

You are not convened here to debate an ordinary post-coup transition. You are convened here to jointly manage four interlocking crises simultaneously: an unconstitutional change of power in Bamako; a separatist project in Azawad; the consolidation of transnational Salafi-jihadist organizations across northern towns and cities; and a continent-wide food security crisis underlined by severe humanitarian concerns. Each crisis demands different instruments under AU doctrine, different mechanisms within ECOWAS, and different bilateral calculations. The Board will not regard lightly any solution that addresses only fragments of these interconnected realities. As of the freeze, nearly two thirds of Mali's national territory has slipped from effective government control. Constitutional order in the capital has fractured under the authority of the Comité National pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l'État (CNRDRE), led by Amadou Haya Sanogo. In a communiqué dated 6 April, Bilal ag Acherif proclaimed the secession of Azawad, while Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa rapidly displaced secular Tuareg authorities from occupied towns and cities.

Delegates, we also look toward your rhetoric, because a crisis committee without strong speeches is merely a very expensive group chat with placards. We expect fiery debate, strategic diplomacy, late-night alliances formed under "strictly national interest," and directives written with equal parts brilliance and panic moments before the deadline. Yet beneath the humour lies reality: insurgencies do not wait for moderated caucuses, and states can collapse faster than commu-niqués can be drafted. The communiqué remains the defining instrument of this Council and the principal mechanism through which it addresses the continent, defines obligations, and authorizes action. Delegates capable of combining rhetoric with operational precision will prove indispensable.

We eagerly await a committee characterized by rigorous research, demanding debate, strategic diplomacy, and fruitful deliberation.

Yours faithfully,

The Executive Board,

African Union Peace and Security Council



COMMITTEE OVERVIEW

Delegates, you sit within the primary decision-making organ of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture, a body built on the foundational principle of "African Solutions to African Problems." Under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, you hold the unique legal authority to intervene in Member States during grave circumstances, impose sanctions for unconstitutional changes of government, and authorize peace support missions. Today, the heart of the Sahel is breaking, and the continent looks to this room for a decisive response that balances regional sovereignty with immediate military necessity.

It is April 7, 2012, and Mali, once a beacon of stable democracy in West Africa, is currently a state in name only. Over the last three weeks, a catastrophic "perfect storm" has effectively split the nation in two. In the South, a military junta led by Captain Amadou Sanogo remains embedded in the halls of power in Bamako following the March 22 coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré. While a Framework Agreement was signed just yesterday to return power to civilians, the situation remains incredibly volatile. The junta's presence has triggered crippling sanctions and Mali's suspension from the Union, leaving the government paralyzed at the exact moment it needs to be strongest.

Simultaneously, the Republic faces an existential threat in the North. Taking advantage of the chaos in the capital, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has swept across the northern desert, and just twenty-four hours ago, they officially declared the unilateral independence of the "State of Azawad." This marks the first time in the history of the African Union that the borders of a Member State have been redrawn by force. Ancient cities like Timbuktu and Gao are now under the control of a fractured alliance of secular separatists and radical extremist groups like Ansar Dine, who have already begun imposing a strict and violent interpretation of Sharia law.

As a member of this Council, your task is not merely to discuss these events but to legislate and mandate a path forward. You are faced with a dual emergency that challenges the very core of the AU's Lomé Declaration. Your objectives are to ensure the military junta actually vacates power to allow for a civilian-led transition, to formulate a response to the declaration of Azawad that preserves Mali's territorial integrity, and to coordinate a humanitarian response for the 200,000 displaced people currently fleeing toward the borders of Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso.

AFRICAN UNION

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IMPORTANCE OF THE FREEZE DATE- 7th April 2012



Delegates, the freeze date of this committee is **April 7th, 2012, 0900 Hours.**

The freeze date stands as one of the precise moments at which a cascade of preceding events crystalised into an unresolved present at which the council is convened to act before the next phase of conflict unfolds.

The events leading to the date lead to an interlocking sequence. On 17 January 2012, On 17 January 2012, the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) opened simultaneous offensives at Ménaka, Aguelhok, and Tessalit, exploiting the influx of Tuareg fighters and Libyan-origin weaponry that had flowed southward after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in October 2011. The execution of approximately 70 to 97 Malian soldiers captured at Aguelhok on 24 January constituted both a war crime under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the political detonator of everything that followed. The fall of Tessalit on 11 March and the loss of the only airport in the northern side confirmed the inability of the Malian army to defend the territory and crystallised soldiers' and public grievances against the Toure government.

On 21st March, the Kati garrison mutinied. By the following morning, the Comité National pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l'Etat (CNRDRE), under Captain Sanogo, had taken control of the state broadcaster and the presidential palace at Koulouba. President Toure evaded capture and went into hiding. The 1992 constitution was suspended. Within a single week, the Malian army in the north, without any coherent political direction from Bamako, collapsed entirely. Kidal soon fell on 30th March, Gao on 31st March, and Timbuktu on 1st April. Colonel El Hadj, a famous loyalist Tuareg, withdrew into Niger. Approximately two thirds of the national territory passed out of effective control of the Malian state. Mali was suspended from the AU on 23 March under Article 30 of the Constitutive Act. ECOWAS convened emergency summits at Abidjan and Dakar, designating Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré as mediator. The UN Security Council adopted the Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/7 on 26 March. ECOWAS imposed comprehensive sanctions on 2 April, including the closure of land borders, the freezing of Malian state assets at the BCEAO, and a travel ban on the CNRDRE leadership. A second PSC communiqué followed on 3 April, and a joint AU-ECOWAS communiqué on 5 April.

The 6th of April is the most important date. On this day the framework agreement was signed under Ouagadougou, which provided for the resignation of President Toure, the assumption of interim presidency for Dioncounda Traore under article 36 of the Malian Constitution, the formation of a government of national unity, and the lifting of ECOWAS sanctions upon its implementation. On the Same day, the MNLA declared the independence of the Azawad, a declaration which was recognised by no state and rejected by the African Union, ECOWAS and every other significant actor.

The issue of constitutional, territorial, jihadist, and humanitarian elements remains unresolved. It is in the immediate aftermath of these developments, on the 7th of April, 2012, that the council convened.

TIMELINE

October 2011: The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad which is the MNLA is formed. This happens after armed Tuareg fighters come back from Libya.

16th January 2012: The MNLA launches a rebellion against the Malian government in northern Mali.

18th January 2012: Fighting starts around Aguelhok, Ménaka and Tessalit.

24th January 2012: The Aguelhok military base falls to the forces.

Late January 2012: People start to leave their homes and go to Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso.

3rd February 2012: People protest in Bamako because they are not happy with how the government's handling the war.

8th February 2012: Families of soldiers demonstrate against shortages and battlefield losses.

Mid-February 2012: The MNLA gains control of rural areas across the Kidal Region.

1st March 2012: People start to lose confidence in President Amadou Toumani Touré because the military is not doing well.

20th March 2012: The dissatisfaction among soldiers at the Kati military camp becomes very serious.

21st March 2012: A mutiny breaks out at the Kati military camp near Bamako.

22nd March 2012: Captain Amadou Sanogo leads a coup d'état. Establishes the CNRDRE junta.

23rd March 2012: The Constitution is. State institutions are dissolved.

24th March 2012: The ECOWAS, the AU, UN, EU and major powers condemn the coup.

26th March 2012: The MNLA rebel forces take advantage of the crisis and intensify their northern offensive.

27th March 2012: ECOWAS convenes emergency meetings on the situation in Mali.

29th March 2012: ECOWAS threatens sanctions unless the constitutional order is restored.

30th March 2012: The rebels capture Kidal while ECOWAS imposes sanctions on Mali.

31st March 2012: Gao falls to the forces after the government resistance collapses.

1st April 2012: Timbuktu falls leaving most of Mali outside the government control.

2nd April 2012: The ECOWAS mediators begin negotiations with the junta in Bamako.

4th April 2012: The junta leaders show that they are willing to negotiate a transition.

5th April 2012: ECOWAS and the junta finalize the framework for a transition agreement.

6th April 2012: The MNLA declares the independence of Azawad.

6th April 2012: The Bamako Framework Agreement is signed between ECOWAS and the junta.

7th April 2012: Mali enters a phase as the implementation of the Framework Agreement begins.

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IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS AND PAST ACTIONS

AU PSC Communiqué of 23 March 2012

PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXIV). The Council's first substantive response to the coup. Condemned in

the strongest terms the unconstitutional change of government; demanded the immediate restoration of constitutional order; suspended Mali from participation in all AU activities under Article 7(g) of the

PSC Protocol and Article 4(p) and 30 of the Constitutive Act.

ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit, Abidjan, 27 March 2012

Convened by ECOWAS Chair Alassane Ouattara. The Final Communiqué condemned the coup, designated Burkinabé President Compaoré as ECOWAS Mediator, and put the CNRDRE on notice of imminent sanctions.

ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit, Dakar, 29 March 2012

Suspended Mali from all ECOWAS institutions. Threatened comprehensive sanctions. Authorised the activation of the ECOWAS Standby Force as a contingency measure.

UN Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/7, 26 March 2012

The first UN Security Council substantive action on the Mali file. Condemned the unconstitutional change of government, demanded immediate restoration of constitutional order, expressed support for African mediation efforts. Did not invoke Chapter VII.

ECOWAS Sanctions of 2 April 2012

Imposed after the CNRDRE refused to step aside. Sanctions included: closure of land borders with Mali; freezing of Malian state assets at the BCEAO; suspension of financial transactions through the West African Monetary Union system; travel ban on CNRDRE leadership; suspension of ECOWAS development cooperation excepting humanitarian assistance

AU PSC Communiqué of 3 April 2012

Reaffirmed the suspension of Mali. Authorised the Commission Chairperson to consult with

ECOWAS on the deployment of an African force. Threatened further measures including targeted sanctions on CNRDRE leadership.

Joint AU-ECOWAS Communiqué, 5 April 2012

Consolidated the unified African position: rejection of the unconstitutional change of government; rejection of any secession of the Azawad; demand for full implementation of the Framework Agreement.

The Framework Agreement of 6 April 2012

Signed at Ouagadougou between the CNRDRE (Captain Sanogo) and ECOWAS (Mediator

Compaoré). Provisions: resignation of President Touré; assumption of interim presidency by

Dioncounda Traoré under Article 36 of the Malian Constitution; formation of a government of

national unity; lifting of ECOWAS sanctions upon implementation. Addresses only the southern


constitutional dimension; the question of the north is unaddressed.

MNLA Declaration of Independence of the Azawad, 6 April 2012

Signed by MNLA Secretary-General Bilal ag Acherif. Proclaims the independence of the Azawad and calls for international recognition. Cites the framework of self-determination under UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960). As of the freeze date, recognised by no state and rejected by all significant actors.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

Geography and Demography



The Republic of Mali is a landlocked state of approximately 1.24 million square kilometres in the West African Sahel. It is bordered by Algeria to the north, Niger to the east, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire to the south, Guinea to the south-west, and Senegal and Mauritania to the west. Its population in 2012 is estimated at approximately 15.5 million, the overwhelming majority of whom inhabit the southern third of the country, in the Sahelian and Sudanian zones along the Niger river. The northern two-thirds the regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, together comprising roughly 60% of national territory are sparsely inhabited Saharan and sahelio-saharan zones, populated by Tuareg (Kel Tamasheq), Arab, Songhai, and Fulani communities. This north-south imbalance is the structural fact from which the Mali crisis proceeds. Roughly 90% of the population produces and consumes in the south; the political, economic, and military centre of gravity sits in Bamako, on the Niger. The north is, from the perspective of the Bamako state, both peripheral and expensive: distant, lightly administered, and reliant on transfers. From the

perspective of the northern Tuareg communities, the post-colonial Malian state is itself an alien construct which is a southern, sedentary, Mande and Manding-speaking polity that inherited from France an administrative claim over the desert that it has neither the capacity nor, on Tuareg accounts, the legitimacy to exercise.

What they call the Azawad in the Malian context extends across what are today five sovereign states:

Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya, and Burkina Faso. Their society has historically been organised into tribal confederations (the principal Malian ones being the Iwellemmeden Kel Ataram, the Kel Adagh, the Kel Antessar, and the Iforas), governed by traditional aristocracies and structured around camel pastoralism, trans-Saharan caravan trade, and a distinctive matrilineal cultural inheritance. The French military penetration of the Sahara, completed by the early twentieth century, imposed colonial frontiers across this fabric. The 1908 pacification of the Adagh completed only after the 1916–1917 revolt led by Kawsen ag Mohammed ag Geda in the Aïr institutionalised the partition. At independence in 1960, those colonial borders were inherited by the new Malian state, against the wishes of Tuareg leadership which had petitioned both Paris and the United Nations for a separate Saharan territory (the proposed Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes, OCRS) that would have aggregated Saharan zones across French West Africa. The Hollow North Study Guide Underlying the cycle of rebellions is a structural condition often described as the "hollow north." The Malian state's administrative footprint in the regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu has, in the two decades since the

The National Pact of 1992, remained extraordinarily thin. The structural weakness is compounded by demographic and ecological pressures that have steadily intensified since the great droughts of 1973 and 1984. Sahelian pastoralism, the traditional Tuareg and Arab livelihood, has been progressively undermined by recurrent failures of the rainy season, the contraction of grazing lands, and the loss of herds. The result has been a steady drift of young men out of pastoral economies and into the cash economies of the towns, the smuggling corridors, and for many into armed formations of one kind or another. The MNLA's manpower base, the recruitment pool for Ansar Dine, and the cadre of trafficking intermediaries all draw, in significant part, from this same generation of dispossessed pastoral youth.

Compounding the hollow state is a deepening criminal economy. Since the mid-2000s, The Mali-Niger-Algeria triangle has emerged as a major trans-Saharan corridor for the trafficking of cocaine (from Latin America via the Gulf of Guinea), cannabis resin (from Morocco), cigarettes, fuel, weapons, and human beings. Revenue streams from this trafficking have accrued to local notables, elements within the

Malian security services, AQIM cells, and a range of intermediaries. The kidnap-for-ransom industry, in particular, has grown into a multi-million euro enterprise: AQIM is estimated to have received, between 2003 and 2011, ransoms amounting to tens of millions of euros, principally from European governments unwilling to publicly confirm payments.

The cycle of rebellions: 1963, 1990, 2006

The history of independent Mali is punctuated by Tuareg rebellions, each conditioned by the failures of the preceding settlement. There have been, prior to the present uprising, three principal rebellions: 1963–1964, 1990–1996, and 2006–2009. The 2012 rebellion is the fourth, and the first to have produced the territorial collapse of the Malian state in the north.

The First Rebellion (1963–1964): Alfellaga

The Alfellaga revolt, centred on the Kel Adagh of the Adrar des Iforas, was triggered by the centralising policies of Modibo Keïta's socialist government in Bamako: compulsory cooperativisation of pastoral economies, the dismantling of traditional aristocratic authority, and a heavily policed military presence. The

The rebellion was small in scale, perhaps a few hundred fighters under Zeyd ag Attaher and Elladi ag Alla and was crushed brutally by the Malian Army.

The post-rebellion settlement involved no political accommodation. Instead, the northern regions were placed under what amounted to a regime of military

administration for nearly two decades. The memory of collective punishment, wells poisoned, livestock slaughtered, summary executions entered Tuareg generational memory as the founding grievance of every subsequent revolt.

The Second Rebellion (1990–1996): the Ishumar generation


The second rebellion, by contrast, was a political and military project of significant ambition. It was driven by a generation of young Tuareg men who had spent the 1970s and 1980s in exile – many in Algeria, many in Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi recruited them into his Islamic Legion and deployed them in Lebanon, Chad, and elsewhere. These exiles, the *ishumar* (from the French *chômeur*, the unemployed), returned to a north devastated by the catastrophic droughts of 1973–1974 and 1984–1985, with military training, political consciousness, and weapons. The rebellion began on 28 June 1990 with the assault on the Ménaka gendarmerie by Iyad ag Ghali's Mouvement Populaire de l'Azawad (MPA). It escalated rapidly through 1991, contributing to the popular and military overthrow of Moussa Traoré in March of that year. The democratic transition under Alpha Oumar Konaré sought a negotiated settlement, producing the Tamanrasset Accords of January 1991 and, more substantively, the National Pact of April 1992. The National Pact provided for the integration of former rebels into the Malian armed forces and administration, the demilitarisation of the north, decentralisation, and economic development. Its centrepiece – the Flamme de la Paix ceremony at Timbuktu on 27 March 1996, in which more than three thousand weapons were publicly incinerated – was intended to consummate the settlement. Implementation, however, it was uneven. Decentralisation was partially achieved; integration into the army was halting and resented on both sides; economic transfers to the north remained inadequate. The settlement also gave rise to a structural feature that would condition every subsequent crisis: the existence of mixed units and former rebels embedded in the Malian armed forces, fluent in both the military and political grammars of the north, capable at any future juncture of defecting back into a rebellion they had helped to suspend.

The Third Rebellion (2006–2009): the Algiers Accord

The third rebellion, narrower in scope than its predecessor, was led principally by the Alliance Démocratique du 23 Mai pour le Changement (ADC) of Ibrahim ag

Bahanga and Hassan ag Fagaga. It was triggered by perceived failures to implement the National Pact's military integration provisions and by the encroachment of southern soldiers and administrative structures into the Kidal region. After a series of attacks on Malian Army positions in May 2006, mediation by Algeria produced the Algiers Accord of 4 July 2006. The accord provided for the creation of a special development zone in the north, the deployment of mixed special units, and the dismantling of certain army garrisons. Ag Bahanga rejected the accord and continued attacks through 2007–2008. A counter-offensive by the Malian Army, supported by allied Tuareg militias under Colonel El Hadj Ag Gamou and the Imghad confederation a lower-status Tuareg group historically opposed to the Ifoghas aristocracy drove ag Bahanga's forces across the border into Libya by February 2009. He would remain in Libyan exile until the fall of Gaddafi, returning to the Adrar des Iforas in mid-2011, where he died in a car accident on 26 August 2011; a development of substantial consequence, since it removed the most militant and least compromising of the senior Tuareg commanders at the moment of the MNLA's consolidation.

The Libyan Spillover



Gaddafi's Tuareg project

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya under Muammar Gaddafi pursued, from the early 1970s until the regime's collapse in October 2011, a sustained policy of cultivation of the Tuareg population. Gaddafi's motivations were mixed and shifting: ideological (pan-Arab and later pan-African projection), instrumental (the construction of a buffer of clients in the Saharan periphery), and strategic (the use of Tuareg fighters in his external campaigns). At its peak in the 1980s, Gaddafi's Islamic Legion incorporated several thousand Tuareg recruits, principally from Mali and Niger, who fought in Lebanon (1976–1978), Chad (multiple campaigns through 1987), and in lesser engagements elsewhere.

From the 2000s onward, as Gaddafi recast himself as the king of African kings and the leader of a pan-African project, the Tuareg dimension of Libyan policy intensified. Senior Tuareg figures, including Ibrahim ag Bahanga in his last exile, and elements associated with what would become the MNLA, received Libyan hospitality, training, and matériel. Gaddafi also positioned himself, repeatedly, as the mediator of northern Malian rebellions, brokering or appearing to broker successive settlements in concert with Algeria.

The collapse, February–October 2011

The Libyan uprising began on 17 February 2011 in Benghazi and escalated within weeks into a civil war. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, authorising "all necessary measures" to protect civilians, and a NATO-led coalition commenced air operations on 19 March under Operation Unified Protector. Tripoli fell on 20 August 2011. Gaddafi was killed at Sirte on 20 October 2011.

The collapse of the Jamahiriya produced two consequences of direct and immediate relevance to the Mali crisis. The first was the unmaking of Gaddafi's security patronage of the Sahelian Tuareg. Several thousand Tuareg combatants ; figures vary, with credible estimates ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 fighters ; who had served in Libyan formations, in some cases for decades, found themselves overnight without patronage, salary, or political project. Many returned to their home territories in Mali, Niger, and Algeria. They returned not as individuals but as cohesive military units, with experienced officers, established chains of command, and a deep ideological and personal investment in the Tuareg national project.

The second consequence was the dispersal of Libyan arsenals. The Jamahiriya had accumulated, over four decades, one of the largest stockpiles of conventional weapons in Africa, much of it Soviet-origin. The collapse of central authority and the destruction or abandonment of arms depots at Sebha, Bani Walid, Misrata, Sirte, and elsewhere released into circulation across the Sahara a flow of light and heavy weaponry of unprecedented scale: assault rifles, heavy machine guns (DShK, KPV), recoilless rifles, mortars, rocket launchers (RPG-7 variants), MILAN anti-tank missiles, ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns, and most consequentially man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), principally SA-7 and SA-24 variants. UN Panel of Experts estimates of MANPADS unaccounted for from Libyan stocks range into the low thousands.

The AU and the Libya question

The Libya episode left, and leaves, the African Union politically wounded. The AU had proposed in March 2011 a roadmap for political settlement of the Libyan crisis, drawn up by a high-level ad hoc committee chaired by the President of Mauritania and including the Presidents of South Africa, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, and Uganda. That roadmap was substantially ignored by the NATO coalition, by the Transitional National Council, and by the western members of the UN Security Council. The widespread perception within the AU is that Resolution 1973 was used to authorise regime change under cover of civilian protection, a perception that conditions the position of much of the African and non-aligned membership of any successor Council on the question of further Chapter VII authorisations in the region.

It also conditions the assessment of consequences. Russia and China abstained on Resolution 1973 and have, since, treated that abstention as a strategic mistake. The continuing flow of Libyan-origin weapons across the Sahel is, for the membership at large, the direct and predictable consequence of an intervention conducted without adequate post-conflict planning. The consolidation of AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO in northern Mali is, in this view, the second-order consequence of the Libyan collapse. The Mali crisis is the bill the Sahel is paying for an intervention conducted elsewhere.

The Aguelhok massacre and its political consequences

On 24 January 2012, MNLA forces, in some accounts joined by Ansar Dine elements, overran the garrison at Aguelhok in the Kidal region. Approximately ninety Malian soldiers were taken prisoner. A subsequent investigation by the Malian government, and credible humanitarian reporting, indicates that a significant number, figures of 70 to 97 are cited, were executed after capture, in some instances by being made to lie on the ground and shot, in others by having their throats cut. The Aguelhok killings, which the Malian state and a substantial portion of public opinion attribute to Ansar Dine elements operating alongside the MNLA, constituted both a war crime under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and a political detonator. The visible failure of the Bamako government to protect, reinforce, or recover its soldiers, and the perception that ill-equipped southern conscripts were being thrown into a desert war for which they were neither trained nor supplied, fed directly into the soldiers' mutiny at Kati on 21 March 2012.

The MNLA rebellion



Formation and leadership

The Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) was publicly announced on 16 October 2011, in a fusion of two predecessor formations: the Mouvement National de l'Azawad (MNA), a primarily political organisation founded by Tuareg activists in 2010 to advocate for autonomy through non-violent means, and the Mouvement Touareg du Nord-Mali (MTNM), the armed remnant of

the 2006–2009 rebellion under Ibrahim ag Bahanga. The MNLA's stated political objective is the independence of the Azawad defined as the three northern regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu under a secular, republican constitution.

The political programme set out in the MNLA's founding documents articulates a self-conception in the lineage of decolonial national-liberation movements: an indigenous people, historically distinct from the dominant ethnic groups of the post-colonial state, asserts the right of self-determination against an administrative frontier imposed by external power. The MNLA invokes ; explicitly in some of its communications, implicitly throughout; the framework of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), the principle of self-determination, and the Tuareg petitions of the late colonial period seeking a separate Saharan territory. It is a self-conception calibrated for international audiences and for an audience of Western governments and human rights organisations sympathetic to indigenous causes. The movement's senior leadership reflects the fusion. The Secretary-General is Bilal ag Acherif, a former MNA figure of the Iforas. The Chief of Staff is Mohamed ag Najim, a former colonel in the Libyan armed forces of Tuareg origin who returned from Libya in late 2011 with a substantial cadre of trained fighters and heavy equipment. The political bureau also includes Hama ag Sid'Ahmed (spokesperson), Mahmoud ag Aghaly (president of the political wing), and senior military figures. The MNLA claims a fighting strength of several thousand combatants; outside estimates range from approximately 2,500 to 4,000 effectives, with substantial heavy equipment (DShK and KPV heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, 60mm and 82mm mortars, RPG-7s, and Toyota pickup-mounted weapons systems in the trans-Saharan raiding style).

The opening of the campaign

MNLA combat operations commenced on 17 January 2012 with simultaneous attacks on Malian Army positions at Ménaka (Gao region), Aguelhok and Tessalit (Kidal region). The opening operations established a pattern: highly mobile mounted columns, well-equipped with heavy machine guns and recoilless weapons, conducting concentrated assaults on isolated Malian Army garrisons and then withdrawing before reinforcement could arrive. The Malian Army, structured and equipped principally for internal security and southern defence, found itself unable

to either hold dispersed garrisons or concentrate forces fast enough to engage the rebels in decisive combat.

Through February and early March, the campaign expanded westward and northward. Tessalit, the principal Malian Army base in the far north and home to a strategic airstrip, was placed under siege from mid-February and fell on 11 March 2012. The fall of Tessalit was both a tactical disaster (the loss of the only hardened airfield in the north) and a political shock (the visible inability of the Malian Army to relieve a besieged position). The Aguelhok killings and the fall of Tessalit are the two events that most directly precipitate the coup.

The question of coordination with Ansar Dine

From the outset of the campaign, the MNLA has operated in close tactical proximity with Ansar Dine the salafi-jihadist formation under the command of Iyad ag Ghali, the former MPA founder of the 1990s rebellion who has, in the intervening two decades, undergone a religious transformation toward Salafism. The precise nature of the MNLA Ansar Dine relationship is contested and will be a recurring question in committee. Three positions are advanced.

The MNLA's own position is that the two movements are operationally distinct and ideologically incompatible; the MNLA is secular and republican; Ansar Dine seeks the imposition of sharia and that any apparent coordination in early operations was a matter of tactical convergence rather than alliance. The Malian state position, by contrast, is that the MNLA and Ansar Dine are operationally fused, that the distinction is a political fiction maintained for international consumption, and that the MNLA has knowingly enabled the entry of jihadist forces into the population centres of the north. The intermediate position, held by most external analysts, is that the two movements have a relationship of opportunistic tactical cooperation which is in the process of breaking down as Ansar Dine and its AQIM partners achieve sufficient strength to compete with and likely supplant the MNLA in the newly captured towns.


The cascade

In the immediate aftermath of the coup in Bamako (22 March), the Malian Army in the north, already overextended, demoralised, and now without coherent political direction from the capital ; collapsed. Kidal fell to combined MNLA and Ansar Dine forces on 30 March 2012. Gao fell on 31 March. Timbuktu fell on 1 April. In

each case the Malian Army garrison either withdrew without serious engagement, defected, or was overrun in localised combat. Colonel El Hadj Ag Gamou, the senior Tuareg loyalist officer, conducted a fighting withdrawal from Gao into Niger, where his forces have since been interned by Nigerien authorities.

The MNLA proclaimed the independence of the Azawad on 6 April 2012, in a communiqué signed by Bilal ag Acherif. The declaration has, as of the freeze date, been recognised by no state. The African Union, ECOWAS, the United Nations Secretary-General, the European Union, France, the United States, Algeria, and every other significant actor have rejected it. The principle of the territorial integrity of Mali *uti possidetis* applied to the post-colonial frontier is, on this question, the one matter on which the international consensus is genuinely unanimous.

But the more consequential development of early April is not the political declaration; it is the visible loss, in Gao and especially Timbuktu, of MNLA operational primacy. In both cities, Ansar Dine forces have, within forty-eight hours of the fall, raised their black banner alongside or in place of the MNLA's tricolour. Iyad ag Ghali has appeared personally in Timbuktu. AQIM commanders notably Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abdelhamid Abou Zeid are credibly reported in the city. The Sufi shrines of Timbuktu, sixteen of which are inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage list, are at imminent risk.



NON STATE ACTORS AND OTHER FACTIONS

The Non-State Actors act as the key impetus of the crisis. Without the Libyan Cadree, the MNLA had been powerless. Without the ten-year embedding of AQIM in the Adrar des Iforas, Ansar Dine would have been devoid of a logistical sanctuary. Without the personal pivot of Iyad ag Ghali's to Salafism during 2007 to 2011, the religious side of the rebellion would not exist in its present form.

Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA)

The most important Tuareg separatist organization in the current crisis is the MNLA. The movement was formed on 16 October 2011 from the merger of the MNA (political arm; created in 2010) and the MTNM (armed wing of the rebellion of 2006-2009). The stated goal is the creation of the state of Azawad (comprising the northern regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu) with a secular and republican constitution.

Leadership:

1. Bilal ag Acherif (Secretary General, Ifoghas)
2. Mohamed ag Najim (Chief of Staff, formerly colonel in Libyan army)
3. Hama ag Sid'Ahmed (spokesperson)
4. Mahmoud ag Aghaly (head of political wing)

Number of soldiers estimated at between 2,500 and 4,000, with significant heavy equipment. The MNLA program explicitly refers to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of the United Nations General Assembly, and to the right to self-determination.

For external (and perhaps also internal) consumption, the MNLA has hitherto sought to pass itself off as an archetypal post-colonial national-liberation

movement. In this endeavor, it has been hindered by its de facto operational collaboration with Ansar Dine during the January-April 2012 campaign.

Ansar Dine

Ansar Dine also known as "Defenders of the Faith" was a formally organized, armed group, headed by Iyad ag Ghali, which emerged at the end of 2011.

Ag Ghali, the founder of the MPA (Malian People's Movement), signatory of the National Pact, rebel in the 1990s, diplomat (consul in Jeddah 2007-2010, influenced there by Salafists in Saudi Arabia and the missionary work of the Tablighi) and defeated challenger for the MNLA leadership late in 2011. Ag Ghali subsequently drew a band of his followers to an explicit, Salafist agenda of the implementation of sharia over all of Mali, not just in the Azawad. His support base includes the traditional constituency of the Ifoghas tribes of the Kidal area (his home base), returnees from Libya who fought for him and not for Mohamed ag Najim, and a growing body of non-Tuareg jihadists from other areas.

Ansar Dine's links to AQIM are significant, which included joint military actions, shared infrastructure and multiple assets, inter-marriage into the principal Tuareg elements of the Iforas, and joint use of the Adrar des Iforas massif as operational space. The Ansar Dine agenda does not rhyme with that of the MNLA's liberal national liberation program. There is clear, apparent rivalry between Ansar Dine and the MNLA for control over Gao and Timbuktu following their fall on March 31 and April 1.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQIM (Tanzim al-Qaida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami) was formed in January 2007 by the merger of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in the Al-Qaeda network. AQIM's pivot point had been the Kabyle mountains and the area around Boumerdes

In the northern part of Algeria. However, significant changes were seen during the 2000s and the organisation started moving to the Saheil Region.

The southern thrust was a voluntary decision forced by pressure. By mid 2000 the Algerian intelligence services (Departement du Renseignement et de la Scurit-DRS) had destroyed the GSPC's northern foothold. The Sahel had what northern Algeria did not: room to operate, limited state capacity, permeable frontiers, and a regional economy which could readily absorb the integration of jihadist logistics and smuggling operations.

AQIM Sahelian forces are based upon a network of katibas. The ones with the most relevance to the crisis in Mali are Katibat al-Mulathameen ('the Masked Brigade') under Mokhtar Belmokhtar, based in the Adrar des Iforas-Tigharghar region, with specialization in smuggling and hostage taking-for-ransom; Katibat Tariq ibn Ziyad under Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, based in the Timbuktu region and responsible for some of the most barbarous European executions; and a third Sahelian katiba led by Yahya Abou al-Hammam (Djamel Okacha). The Sahelian emirs have significant room to manoeuvre relatively independent of the AQIM central command led by Abdelmalek Droukdel in northern Algeria.

The financial infrastructure of Sahelian AQIM is significant. It has been reported that AQIM gained between 50 and 90 million euros between 2003 and 2011 in ransom money, and has bought with this cash a fleet of vehicles, some heavy weapons (particularly after the fall of Libya), communication devices and-most importantly,local support-through the practice of making down payments to Tuareg and Arab families whose members AQIM men have married into. AQIM's embedding in local kinship structures, via marriage, is one reason for its tenacity.

Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

The Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) was seen publicly in October 2011 with the kidnapping of three European aid workers from a Sahrawi refugee camp at Tindouf in western Algeria. MUJAO frames itself as a split from AQIM, the ranks of which are strengthened by Mauritanian and Sahrawi leaders (such as Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou and Sultan Ould Bady) who have previously called for a territorial and ethnic expansion of jihad beyond the Algerian-Arab stronghold of AQIM to the west.

While the smallest of the three jihadist blocs in the Mali theatre on the date of the freeze, MUJAO is in the process of establishing a strong base in the region around Gao, and it is the most probable formation to recruit and utilize non-Tuareg recruits in Songhai and Arab populations of the middle Niger river valley.

Tuareg

Mali is ethnically diverse. According to the CIA, 50% of Mali's population are Mande (Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke), 17% Peul (or Fulani), 12% Voltaic, 6% Songhai, 10% Tuareg and Moor (i.e. Arab), and 5% "other". This population can be sub-divided further. The vast majority of Malian Arabs belong to the Berabiche or Kounta confederations.

Although only a small minority in Mali, the Tuareg's rebellions have played a significant role in post-colonial Malian history. A people related to the Berber inhabitants of North Africa, Tuareg can be found in the Saharan and Sahelian parts of Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya. Language is also partially constitutive of "Tuareg identity"-hence, Tuareg refer to themselves collectively as "Kel Tamasheq", meaning speakers of Tamasheq. Estimates of Tuareg numbers vary greatly. Le Monde estimated in 2012 that the Sahara has 1.5 million Tuareg inhabitants: 850,000 in Niger, 550,000 in Mali, 50,000 in Algeria, and the remaining 50,000 in Libya and Burkina Faso (only a small number Tuareg inhabit Nigeria).⁵ Other sources place the Tuareg population in Mali at 950,000. The only region in Mali where Tuareg are the majority is Kidal (although the numbers for Timbuktu are also contested by Tuareg activists).

The traditional livelihoods of the Tuareg are herding and trading in nomadic caravan routes. This tradition has been complicated by recurring Sahel droughts. A key source of grievance among separatist Tuareg, and northern Malians generally, is the Malian state's relative neglect of the north's starving population. In addition, while the majority of Tuareg live in the north, in the state they are largely ignored by the southerners who run it. The only Tuareg prime minister has been Ahmed Mohamed Ag Hamani, but never a head of state. Yet, in 2002 and 2007 many

Tuareg leaders were elected deputies to the National Assembly. Such individuals include Alghabass Ag Intalla and Mohamed Ag Intalla, part of the Kel Adagh nobility.

Tuareg society is comprised of confederations and clans of clans. Mali's Adrar des Ifoghas massif's Kel Adagh confederation has played a leading role in post-colonial rebellions. Iyad Ag Ghali, Alghabass Ag Intalla, and many leaders on both sides of the current conflict come from the nobility of the Kel Adagh, the leader (amenokal) of which is currently the son of Ag Intalla, Intalla Ag Attaher. Both Ifoghas Tuareg, along with members of the historically rival Idnan tribe, were prominent leaders of the 1963 and 1990 rebellions and have become central figures in the MNLA. Some commentators suggest that the growing rifts between Tuareg political and military figures may be the result of intra- Kel Adagh rivalry. In 2011-12 Ag Ghali failed to become leader of the Kel Adagh, and went on to found Ansar al Din. Competition within the Kel Adagh itself, analysts argue, may explain a divide between the MNLA and the Islamist coalition; Iyad Ag Ghali apparently formed Ansar al Din after being out-competed by Ag Intalla for leadership of the Kel Adagh in late 2011/early 2012.

Within the confederations, the Tuareg have been organized according to a hierarchy of free and subordinate castes. Put simply, this structure includes the imushagh (noble warriors with chartered lineage), the ineslemen (religious specialists), imghad (free people with unchartered lineages), inadan (artisans) and iklan (unfree), among others. The term bellah, on the other hand, can refer to the formerly enslaved. Over time, ethnographers have problematized these divisions, and this Handbook includes the terms for use when relevant in understanding internal rebel differences.

Other armed actors

The loyalist Tuareg militia under Colonel El Hadj Ag Gamou, from the Imghad confederation (which used to take its orders from the Ifoghas aristocracy) put up a fighting retreat out of Gao to Niger in late March; they are at present being held internee by the Nigeriens. The Ganda Koy ("Sons of the Land") Songhai self-defence militia, first formed in 1994 in response to the second Tuareg rebellion is currently reconstituting in response to the mobilization against the MNLA in Gao

and along the river valley of the non-Tuareg inhabitants of the area. The reconstitution of corresponding Fulani and Arab self-defence formations in the area in the weeks ahead is almost certain.

PERTINENT COUNTRIES

MALI

Mali was the primary state affected by the 2012 crisis and faced one of the most severe challenges in its post-independence history. The crisis began in January 2012 when the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg separatist group, launched an armed rebellion in northern Mali. The insurgency was strengthened by the return of heavily armed Tuareg fighters from Libya following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Longstanding grievances regarding political exclusion, economic underdevelopment, and inadequate government investment in the north contributed to support for the rebellion.

As military defeats mounted, dissatisfaction within the Malian armed forces culminated in a coup d'état on 22 March 2012 led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo. The overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré created a political vacuum and weakened the state's ability to respond to the insurgency. Taking advantage of the instability, rebel groups rapidly seized major northern cities including Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu.

The crisis threatened Mali's territorial integrity, national unity, and democratic institutions. It also displaced thousands of civilians, worsened humanitarian conditions, and raised concerns regarding regional security across the Sahel. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Mali faced the dual challenge of restoring constitutional order in Bamako while re-establishing control over its northern territories.

MAURITANIA

Mauritania played an important regional role during the 2012 Mali crisis due to its shared border with Mali and its security concerns regarding instability in the Sahel. Although Mauritania was not directly involved in the conflict, it closely monitored developments as the rebellion and political turmoil in Mali threatened to spill across borders. The Mauritanian government was particularly concerned about the activities of extremist groups operating in the Sahara and the movement of weapons and fighters following the collapse of Libya in 2011.

As violence intensified in northern Mali, Mauritania strengthened border security and coordinated with neighboring states to prevent the spread of insecurity. The crisis also created humanitarian challenges, as Malian refugees fled into Mauritanian territory seeking safety. Mauritania supported regional efforts led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to restore constitutional order in Mali and address the growing security threat in the region. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Mauritania's primary objectives were maintaining border security, preventing extremist expansion, and preserving regional stability.

ALGERIA

Algeria was one of the most influential regional actors during the 2012 Mali crisis due to its long border with northern Mali and its significant experience in combating insurgent and extremist groups. Algeria viewed stability in Mali as essential to its national security, particularly because of concerns regarding arms trafficking, cross-border militancy, and the growing presence of extremist organizations in the Sahara-Sahel region. The collapse of Libya in 2011 and the subsequent flow of weapons into the region heightened these concerns.

Throughout the crisis, Algeria advocated for a political and negotiated solution while closely monitoring developments in northern Mali. It maintained diplomatic contacts with various regional actors and emphasized the importance of preserving Mali's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Algeria also strengthened border security measures to prevent the movement of fighters and weapons across its southern

frontier. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Algeria's primary objectives were preventing the expansion of extremist groups, avoiding regional destabilization, securing its borders, and supporting efforts to restore stability in Mali while preserving regional security.

SENEGAL

Senegal was a strong supporter of constitutional governance and regional stability during the 2012 Mali crisis. As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Senegal viewed the conflict in Mali and the military coup of 22 March 2012 as serious threats to democracy and security in West Africa. The Senegalese government condemned the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré and supported ECOWAS efforts to restore constitutional order in Mali.

Senegal was also concerned about the broader regional consequences of the crisis, including the spread of armed groups, terrorism, illicit trafficking, and refugee movements across West Africa. Through ECOWAS, Senegal backed diplomatic initiatives, sanctions against the junta, and discussions regarding regional assistance to Mali. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Senegal's primary objectives were the restoration of democratic governance in Mali, the preservation of Mali's territorial integrity, and the prevention of further instability throughout the West African region.

BURKINA FASO

Burkina Faso played a significant diplomatic role during the 2012 Mali crisis due to its geographic proximity and longstanding involvement in mediating conflicts in northern Mali. As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Burkina Faso was actively engaged in regional efforts to address both the military coup in Bamako and the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. President

Blaise Compaoré served as the ECOWAS-appointed mediator for the Mali crisis and worked to facilitate dialogue among the various political and armed actors involved.

The Burkinabè government was concerned that instability in Mali could lead to increased refugee flows, cross-border insecurity, arms trafficking, and the spread of extremist groups throughout the Sahel. Burkina Faso supported ECOWAS initiatives aimed at restoring constitutional order, preserving Mali's territorial integrity, and promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Burkina Faso's primary objectives were regional stability, successful mediation efforts, prevention of further conflict escalation, and the restoration of legitimate governance in Mali.

GUINEA

Guinea was an important regional stakeholder during the 2012 Mali crisis as a neighboring West African state and a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Guinean government viewed the military coup of 22 March 2012 and the subsequent loss of government control in northern Mali as serious threats to regional stability and democratic governance. Guinea supported ECOWAS efforts to restore constitutional order in Mali and opposed any actions that could undermine Mali's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The crisis also raised concerns in Guinea regarding refugee movements, cross-border insecurity, arms trafficking, and the potential spread of instability throughout West Africa. Through its participation in ECOWAS, Guinea backed diplomatic initiatives, regional mediation efforts, and collective measures aimed at resolving the crisis peacefully. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Guinea's primary objectives were the restoration of democratic governance in Mali, the preservation of regional security, and the prevention of further destabilization in the West African region.

NIGER

Niger was one of the states most directly affected by the 2012 Mali crisis due to its long border with Mali and its large Tuareg population. The Nigerien government closely monitored developments in northern Mali, fearing that the Tuareg rebellion could inspire similar separatist sentiments among Tuareg communities within Niger. The return of armed fighters and weapons from Libya following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 further heightened security concerns.

As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Niger strongly supported efforts to restore constitutional order in Mali after the military coup of 22 March 2012. The government also opposed any attempt to partition Mali, emphasizing the importance of territorial integrity and regional stability. Additionally, Niger faced the challenge of managing refugee inflows from northern Mali while combating extremist groups operating across the Sahara-Sahel region. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Niger's primary objectives were securing its borders, preventing the spread of separatism and extremism, supporting ECOWAS mediation efforts, and preserving Mali's unity and stability.

COTE D'IVOIRE

Côte d'Ivoire was a key regional actor during the 2012 Mali crisis as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and one of West Africa's most influential economies. The Ivorian government viewed the military coup of 22 March 2012 and the subsequent deterioration of security in northern Mali as major threats to regional stability, democratic governance, and economic development. Having recently emerged from its own political crisis, Côte d'Ivoire strongly opposed unconstitutional changes of government and supported ECOWAS efforts to restore constitutional order in Mali.

Côte d'Ivoire also expressed concern over the potential spread of armed conflict, terrorism, illicit trafficking, and refugee movements across West Africa. Through its participation in ECOWAS, the country backed diplomatic pressure on the junta in Bamako and supported regional initiatives aimed at preserving Mali's territorial integrity. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Côte d'Ivoire's primary objectives were the restoration of democratic governance in Mali, the protection of regional security, and the prevention of further destabilization in West Africa.

AFRICAN UNION PEACE & SECURITY COUNCIL **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

The United States was a significant international stakeholder in the 2012 Mali crisis due to its longstanding security cooperation with Mali and its broader counterterrorism interests in the Sahara-Sahel region. Prior to the crisis, the United States had provided military training, development assistance, and support for regional security initiatives aimed at combating extremist groups. The military coup of 22 March 2012, however, raised serious concerns in Washington regarding democratic governance and political stability in Mali.

The United States condemned the coup and called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order while expressing support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali. American policymakers were also concerned about the rapid expansion of armed groups in northern Mali, particularly those with links to extremist organizations operating across the region. The crisis threatened to create a security vacuum that could facilitate terrorism, illicit trafficking, and regional instability. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, the United States' primary objectives were restoring democratic governance, preventing the growth of extremist safe havens, supporting regional diplomatic efforts, and maintaining stability throughout the Sahel.

UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom was an important international stakeholder during the 2012 Mali crisis due to its commitment to regional stability, democratic governance, and international security. The UK viewed the military coup of 22 March 2012 and the subsequent collapse of government control in northern Mali as serious threats to both Mali and the wider Sahel region. The British government condemned the unconstitutional seizure of power and supported international calls for the restoration of constitutional order.

The United Kingdom was also concerned by the growing influence of armed and extremist groups in northern Mali, fearing that instability could contribute to terrorism, organized crime, and regional insecurity. Working alongside its international partners, the UK supported diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the crisis peacefully while preserving Mali's sovereignty and territorial integrity. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, the United Kingdom's primary objectives were the restoration of democratic governance, the containment of extremist threats, the protection of regional stability, and support for coordinated international and regional responses to the crisis.

FRENCH REPUBLIC

France was the most influential external actor in the 2012 Mali crisis due to its historical ties with Mali, extensive political and economic relationships in West Africa, and strong security interests in the Sahel. Following the Tuareg rebellion in January 2012 and the military coup of 22 March 2012, France strongly condemned the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré and supported ECOWAS efforts to restore constitutional order. Paris consistently emphasized the preservation of Mali's territorial integrity and rejected any attempt to partition the country.

France was particularly concerned about the rapid territorial gains of armed groups in northern Mali and the growing presence of extremist organizations, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which it viewed as a direct threat to regional and European security. France supported diplomatic and political solutions through ECOWAS and the African Union while closely monitoring developments on the ground. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, France had not yet launched a military

intervention but was actively coordinating with regional partners, supporting sanctions against the junta, and advocating for the rapid restoration of civilian rule. France's primary objectives were preserving Mali's territorial integrity, preventing northern Mali from becoming a sanctuary for extremist groups, restoring constitutional governance, and maintaining stability across the Sahel.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA


China was an important international stakeholder during the 2012 Mali crisis, primarily due to its commitment to state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and stability in developing countries. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China closely monitored the situation following the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali and the military coup of 22 March 2012. Beijing expressed concern over the deterioration of security and the disruption of constitutional governance while emphasizing that Mali's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity must be respected.

Consistent with its foreign policy principles, China supported a peaceful and political resolution to the crisis and encouraged dialogue among the parties involved. China was cautious regarding external military involvement and favored solutions led by regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. The crisis also threatened regional stability and economic development, issues of growing importance to Chinese interests in Africa. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, China's primary objectives were the restoration of constitutional order, the preservation of Mali's territorial integrity, regional stability, and a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Russia was an important international actor during the 2012 Mali crisis as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a strong advocate of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Following the Tuareg rebellion and the military coup of 22 March 2012, Russia expressed concern over the deterioration of security in Mali and the growing instability across the Sahel region. Moscow condemned actions that threatened constitutional order while emphasizing the need to preserve Mali's unity and sovereignty.

Russia was particularly concerned about the expansion of extremist and terrorist groups in northern Mali, viewing such developments as a threat to both regional and international security. At the same time, Russia generally favored solutions based on international law, respect for state sovereignty, and cooperation with regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the African Union. By the freeze date of 7 April 2012, Russia's primary objectives were the restoration of constitutional governance, the preservation of Mali's territorial integrity, the containment of extremist groups, and the promotion of a political solution that would prevent further destabilization of the Sahel region.

The logo of the African Union Panel of Experts (AUPSC) is centered in the background. It features a map of the African continent within a circular frame, flanked by olive branches, symbolizing peace and unity.

MANDATE OF AUPSC

The Mandate of this committee is governed by the following instruments:

- The Constitutive Act of the African Union
- The UN Charter(particularly Chapter VIII)
- The AUPSC Protocol

Nature of the AUPSC

The AUPSC, as described under Article 2(1) of the Establishing Protocol, is an organ of the African Union formed under article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act with decision making abilities responsible for collective security and the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. The AUPSC in order to achieve its key objectives is assisted by the African Standby Force under Article 13 of the Protocol.

The powers of the AUPSC however cannot be exercised in violation of the UN charter particularly Chapter VIII(Article 52-54). The AUPSC can only undertake military action upon approval of the UNSC under Article 53.

PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union;

Considering the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, as well as the Charter of the United Nations; **RECALLING** the Declaration on the establishment, within the Organization of African Unity (OAU), of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted by the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, from 28 to 30 June 1993;

Recalling also Decision AHG/Dec.160 (XXXVII) adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 11 July 2001, by which the Assembly decided to incorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the Union, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and, in the regard, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a review of the structures, procedures

and working methods of the Central Organ, including the possibility of changing its name;

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, conferring on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the provisions of the Charter on the role of regional arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the need to forge closer cooperation and partnership between the United Nations, other international organizations and the African Union, in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa;

Acknowledging the contribution of African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability on the Continent and the need to develop formal coordination and cooperation arrangements between these Regional Mechanisms and the African Union;

Recalling Decisions AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV) and AHG/Dec.142 (XXXV) on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999, and Declaration AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000;

Reaffirming our commitment to Solemn Declaration AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI) on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000, as well as Declaration AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII) on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which was adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 11 July 2001;

Affirming our further commitment to Declaration AHG/Decl.2 (XXX) on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, adopted by the 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Tunis, Tunisia, from 13 to 15 June 1994, as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999;

Concerned about the continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to socioeconomic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between our States;

Concerned also by the fact that conflicts have forced millions of our people, including women and children, into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope; **CONCERNED FURTHER** about the scourge of landmines in the Continent and **RECALLING**, in this respect, the Plan of Action on a Landmine Free Africa, adopted by the 1st Continental Conference of African Experts on 3 Anti-Personnel Mines, held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 17 to 19 May 1997, and endorsed by the 66th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 26 to 30 May 1997, as well as subsequent decisions adopted by the OAU on this issue; **CONCERNED ALSO** about the impact of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in threatening peace and security in Africa and undermining efforts to improve the living standards of African peoples and **RECALLING**, in this respect, the Declaration on the Common African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted by the OAU Ministerial Conference held in Bamako, Mali, from 30 November to 1 December 2000, as well as all subsequent OAU decisions on this issue;

Aware that the problems caused by landmines and the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons constitute a serious impediment to Africa's social and economic development, and that they can only be

resolved within the framework of increased and well coordinated continental cooperation;

Aware also of the fact that the development of strong democratic institutions and culture, observance of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the implementation of post-conflict recovery programmes and sustainable development policies, are essential for the promotion of collective security, durable peace and stability, as well as for the prevention of conflicts;

Determined to enhance our capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the Continent and to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the Continent;

Desirous of establishing an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, in accordance with the authority conferred in that regard by Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union;

Hereby agree upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Protocol:

- a) "Protocol" shall mean the present Protocol;

- b) "Cairo Declaration" shall mean the Declaration on the Establishment, within the OAU, of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;
- c) "Lomé Declaration" shall mean the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government;
- d) "Constitutive Act" shall mean the Constitutive Act of the African Union;
- e) "Union" shall mean the African Union;
- f) "Assembly" shall mean the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union;
- g) "Commission" shall mean the Commission of the African Union;
- h) "Regional Mechanisms" shall mean the African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;
- i) "Member States" shall mean Member States of the African Union.

ARTICLE 2

ESTABLISHMENT, NATURE AND STRUCTURE

1. There is hereby established, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, a Peace and Security Council within the Union, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.
2. The Peace and Security Council shall be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.

ARTICLE 3

OBJECTIVES

The objectives for which the Peace and Security Council is established shall be to:

- a. promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;
- b. anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of these conflicts;
- c. promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;
- d. co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;
- e. develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;
- f. promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.

ARTICLE 4

PRINCIPLES

The Peace and Security Council shall be guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It shall, in particular, be guided by the following principles:

- a. peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts;
- b. early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts;
- c. respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law;
- d. interdependence between socio-economic development and the security of peoples and States;
- e. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States;
- f. non interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
- g. sovereign equality and interdependence of Member States;
- h. inalienable right to independent existence;
- i. respect of borders inherited on achievement of independence;
- j. the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act;
- k. the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.

ARTICLE 5

COMPOSITION

1. The Peace and Security Council shall be composed of fifteen Members elected on the basis of equal rights, in the following manner: a. ten Members elected for a term of two years; and b. five Members elected for a term of three years in order to ensure continuity.
2. In electing the Members of the Peace and Security Council, the Assembly shall apply the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation, and the following criteria with regard to each prospective Member State:
 - a. commitment to uphold the principles of the Union;
 - b. contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa – in this respect, experience in peace support operations would be an added advantage;
 - c. capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership;
 - d. participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peacebuilding at regional and continental levels;
 - e. willingness and ability to take up responsibility for regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives;
 - f. contribution to the Peace Fund and/or Special Fund created for specific purpose;
 - g. respect for constitutional governance, in accordance with the Lomé Declaration, as well as the rule of law and human rights;
 - h. having sufficiently staffed and equipped Permanent Missions at the Headquarters of the Union and the United Nations, to be able to shoulder the responsibilities which go with the membership; and j. commitment to honor financial obligations to the Union.
3. A retiring Member of the Peace and Security Council shall be eligible for immediate re-election.
4. There shall be a periodic review by the Assembly to assess the extent to which the Members of the Peace and Security Council continue to meet the requirements spelt out in article 5 (2) and to take action as appropriate.

ARTICLE 6

FUNCTIONS

The Peace and Security Council shall perform functions in the following areas:

- a. promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;
- b. early warning and preventive diplomacy;
- c. peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry;
- d. peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
- e. peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction;
- f. humanitarian action and disaster management;
- g. any other function as may be decided by the Assembly.

ARTICLE 7

POWERS

1. In conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission, the Peace and Security Council shall:

- a. anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity;
- b. undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred;
- c. authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions;
- d. lay down general guidelines for the conduct of such missions, including the mandate thereof, and undertake periodic reviews of these guidelines;
- e. recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments;
- f. approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in a Member State, following a decision by the Assembly, pursuant to article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act;
- g. institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration;
- h. implement the common defense policy of the Union;

- i. ensure the implementation of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international, continental and regional conventions and instruments and harmonize and coordinate efforts at regional and continental levels to combat international terrorism;
- j. promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa;
- k. promote and develop a strong “partnership for peace and security” between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as with other relevant international organizations;
- l. develop policies and action required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union’s objectives and priorities;
- m. follow-up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by Member States;
- n. promote and encourage the implementation of OAU/AU, UN and other relevant international Conventions and Treaties on arms control and disarmament;
- o. examine and take such appropriate action within its mandate in situations where the national independence and sovereignty of a Member State is threatened by acts of aggression, including by mercenaries;
- p. support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters;
- q. submit, through its Chairperson, regular reports to the Assembly on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa; and
- r. decide on any other issue having implications for the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent and exercise powers that may be delegated to it by the Assembly, in accordance with Article 9 (2) of the Constitutive Act. 11

2. The Member States agree that in carrying out its duties under the present Protocol, the Peace and Security Council acts on their behalf.

3. The Member States agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Peace and Security Council, in accordance with the Constitutive Act. 4. The Member States shall extend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by the Peace and Security Council for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, pursuant to the duties entrusted to it under the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 8

PROCEDURE

Organization and Meetings

1. The Peace and Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. For this purpose, each Member of the Peace and Security Council shall, at all times, be represented at the Headquarters of the Union.
2. The Peace and Security Council shall meet at the level of Permanent Representatives, Ministers or Heads of State and Government. It shall convene as often as required at the level of Permanent Representatives, but at least twice a month. The Ministers and the Heads of State and Government shall meet at least once a year, respectively.
3. The meetings of the Peace and Security Council shall be held at the Headquarters of the Union.
4. In the event a Member State invites the Peace and Security Council to meet in its country, provided that two-thirds of the Peace and Security Council members agree, that Member State shall defray the additional expenses incurred by the Commission as a result of the meeting being held outside the Headquarters of the Union.
5. ***Subsidiary Bodies and Sub-Committees*** - The Peace and Security Council may establish such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Such subsidiary bodies may include ad hoc committees for mediation, conciliation or enquiry, consisting of an individual State or group of States. The Peace and Security Council shall also seek such military, legal and other forms of expertise as it may require for the performance of its functions.

6. **Chairmanship** - The chair of the Peace and Security Council shall be held in turn by the Members of the Peace and Security Council in the alphabetical order of their names. Each Chairperson shall hold office for one calendar month.

7. **Agenda** - The provisional agenda of the Peace and Security Council shall be determined by the Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council on the basis of proposals submitted by the Chairperson of the Commission and Member States. The inclusion of any item in the provisional agenda may not be opposed by a Member State.

8. **Quorum** - The number of Members required to constitute a quorum shall be two-thirds of the total membership of the Peace and Security Council.

9. **Conduct of Business** - The Peace and Security Council shall hold closed meetings. Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such Member shall be invited to present its case to the Peace and Security Council as appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from the proceedings.

10. The Peace and Security Council may decide to hold open meetings. In this regard:

a. any Member State which is not a Member of the Peace and Security Council, if it is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council, shall be invited to present its case as appropriate and shall participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion;

b. any Member State which is not a Member of the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that Member State considers that its interests are especially affected;

c. any Regional Mechanism, international organization or civil society organization involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that conflict or situation.

11. The Peace and Security Council may hold informal consultations with parties concerned by or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration, as well

as with Regional Mechanisms, international organizations and civil society organizations as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities.

12. ***Voting*** - Each Member of the Peace and Security Council shall have one vote.

13. Decisions of the Peace and Security Council shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus. In cases where consensus cannot be reached, the Peace and Security Council shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting.

14. ***Rules of Procedure*** - The Peace and Security Council shall submit its own rules of procedure, including on the convening of its meetings, the conduct of business, the publicity and records of meetings and any other relevant aspect of its work, for consideration and approval by the Assembly.

ARTICLE 9

ENTRY POINTS AND MODALITIES FOR ACTION

1. The Peace and Security Council shall take initiatives and action it deems appropriate with regard to situations of potential conflict, as well as to those that have already developed into full-blown conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall also take all measures that are required in order to prevent a conflict for which a settlement has already been reached from escalating.

2. To that end, the Peace and Security Council shall use its discretion to effect entry, whether through the collective intervention of the Council itself, or through its Chairperson and/or the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, and/or in collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms.

ARTICLE 10

THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION

1. The Chairperson of the Commission shall, under the authority of the Peace and Security Council, and in consultation with all parties involved in a conflict, deploy

efforts and take all initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.

2. To this end, the Chairperson of the Commission:

- a. shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any matter, which, in his/her opinion, may threaten peace, security and stability in the Continent;
- b. may bring to the attention of the Panel of the Wise any matter which, in his/her opinion, deserves their attention;
- c. may, at his/her own initiative or when so requested by the Peace and Security Council, use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special representatives, the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms, to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts and promote peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

3. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also:

- a. ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions of the Peace and Security Council, including mounting and deploying peace support missions authorized by the Peace and Security Council. In this respect, the Chairperson of the Commission shall keep the Peace and Security Council informed of developments relating to the functioning of such missions. All problems likely to affect the continued and effective functioning of these missions shall be referred to the Peace and Security Council, for its consideration and appropriate action;
- b. ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions taken by the Assembly in conformity with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
- c. prepare comprehensive and periodic reports and documents, as required, to enable the Peace Security Council and its subsidiary bodies to perform their functions effectively.

4. In the exercise of his/her functions and powers, the Chairperson of the Commission shall be assisted by the Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security, who shall be responsible for the affairs of the Peace and Security Council. The Chairperson of the Commission shall rely on human and material resources available at the Commission, for servicing and providing support to the Peace and Security Council. In this regard, a Peace and Security Council Secretariat shall be established within the Directorate dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution.

ARTICLE 11

PANEL OF THE WISE

1. In order to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention, a Panel of the Wise shall be established.
2. The Panel of the Wise shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. They shall be selected by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned, on the basis of regional representation and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years.
3. The Panel of the Wise shall advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.
4. At the request of the Peace and Security Council or the Chairperson of the Commission, or at its own initiative, the Panel of the Wise shall undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the prevention of conflicts, and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.
5. The Panel of the Wise shall report to the Peace and Security Council and, through the Peace and Security Council, to the Assembly.
6. The Panel of the Wise shall meet as may be required for the performance of its mandate. The Panel of the Wise shall normally hold its meetings at the Headquarters of the Union. In consultation with the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise may hold meetings at such places other than the Headquarters of the Union.
7. The modalities for the functioning of the Panel of the Wise shall be worked out by the Chairperson of the Commission and approved by the Peace and Security Council.

8. The allowances of members of the Panel of the Wise shall be determined by the Chairperson of the Commission in accordance with the Financial Rules and Regulations of the Union.

ARTICLE 12

CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

1. In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established.
2. The Early Warning System shall consist of:
 - a. an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as "The Situation Room", located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module; and
 - b. observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.
3. The Commission shall also collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs, to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System.
4. The Early Warning System shall develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action.
5. The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System timeously to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also use this

information for the execution of the 18 responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol.

6. The Member States shall commit themselves to facilitate early action by the Peace and Security Council and or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information.

7. The Chairperson of the Commission shall, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, work out the practical details for the establishment of the Early Warning System and take all the steps required for its effective functioning.

ARTICLE 13

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

Composition

1. In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.

2. For that purpose, the Member States shall take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention authorized by the Assembly. The strength and types of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location shall be determined in accordance with established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations.

3. **Mandate** - The African Standby Force shall, inter alia, perform functions in the following areas:

- a. observation and monitoring missions;
- b. other types of peace support missions;

- c. intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
- d. preventive deployment in order to prevent
 - (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating,
 - (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and
 - (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;
- e. peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;
- f. humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and
- g. any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.

4. In undertaking these functions, the African Standby Force shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the United Nations and its Agencies, other relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs.

5. The detailed tasks of the African Standby Force and its modus operandi for each authorized mission shall be considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission.

6. ***Chain of Command*** - For each operation undertaken by the African Standby Force, the Chairperson of the Commission shall appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander, whose detailed roles and functions shall be spelt out in appropriate directives, in accordance with the Peace Support Standing Operating Procedures.

7. The Special Representative shall, through appropriate channels, report to the Chairperson of the Commission. The Force Commander shall report to the Special Representative. Contingent Commanders shall report to the Force Commander, while the civilian components shall report to the Special Representative.

8. ***Military Staff Committee*** - There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Peace and Security Council in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

9. The Military Staff Committee shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of the Members of the Peace and Security Council. Any Member State not represented on the Military Staff Committee may be invited by the Committee to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities.

10. The Military Staff Committee shall meet as often as required to deliberate on matters referred to it by the Peace and Security Council.

11. The Military Staff Committee may also meet at the level of the Chief of Defence Staff of the Members of the Peace and Security Council to discuss questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The Chiefs of Defence Staff shall submit to the Chairperson of the Commission recommendations on how to enhance Africa's peace support capacities.

12. The Chairperson of the Commission shall take all appropriate steps for the convening of and follow-up of the meetings of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Members of the Peace and Security Council.

13. **Training** - The Commission shall provide guidelines for the training of the civilian and military personnel of national standby contingents at both operational and tactical levels. Training on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children, shall be an integral part of the training of such personnel.

14. To that end, the Commission shall expedite the development and circulation of appropriate Standing Operating Procedures to inter-alia:

- a. support standardization of training doctrines, manuals and programmes for national and regional schools of excellence;
- b. co-ordinate the African Standby Force training courses, command and staff exercises, as well as field training exercises.

15. The Commission shall, in collaboration with the United Nations, undertake periodic assessment of African peace support capacities.

16. The Commission shall, in consultation with the United Nations Secretariat, assist in the co-ordination of external initiatives in support of the African Standby Force capacity-building in training, logistics, equipment, communications and funding.

17. **Role of Member States** - In addition to their responsibilities as stipulated under the present Protocol:

- a. troop contributing countries States shall immediately, upon request by the Commission, following an authorization by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly, release the standby contingents with the necessary equipment for the operations envisaged under Article 9 (3) of the present Protocol;
- b. Member States shall commit themselves to make available to the Union all forms of assistance and support required for the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent, including rights of passage through their territories. 22

ARTICLE 14

PEACE BUILDING

Institutional Capacity for Peace-building

1. In post-conflict situations, the Peace and Security Council shall assist in the restoration of the rule of law, establishment and development of democratic institutions and the preparation, organization and supervision of elections in the concerned Member State.
2. ***Peace-building during Hostilities*** - In areas of relative peace, priority shall be accorded to the implementation of policy designed to reduce degradation of social and economic conditions arising from conflicts.
3. ***Peace-building at the End of Hostilities*** - To assist Member States that have been adversely affected by violent conflicts, the Peace and Security Council shall undertake the following activities:
 - a. consolidation of the peace agreements that have been negotiated;
 - b. establishment of conditions of political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and Government institutions;
 - c. implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including those for child soldiers;
 - d. resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;
 - e. assistance to vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatized groups in the society.

ARTICLE 15

HUMANITARIAN ACTION

1. The Peace and Security Council shall take active part in coordinating and conducting humanitarian action in order to restore life to normalcy in the event of conflicts or natural disasters.
2. In this regard, the Peace and Security Council shall develop its own capacity to efficiently undertake humanitarian action.
3. The African Standby Force shall be adequately equipped to undertake humanitarian activities in their mission areas under the control of the Chairperson of the Commission.
4. The African Standby Force shall facilitate the activities of the humanitarian agencies in the mission areas.

ARTICLE 16

RELATIONSHIP WITH REGIONAL MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

1. The Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. In this respect, the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission, shall:
 - a) harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union;
 - b) work closely with Regional Mechanisms, to ensure effective partnership between them and the Peace and Security Council in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. The modalities of such partnership shall be determined by the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances.

2. The Peace and Security Council shall, in consultation with Regional Mechanisms, promote initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing 24 conflicts and, in circumstances where conflicts have occurred, peacemaking and peace-building functions.
3. In undertaking these efforts, Regional Mechanisms concerned shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, keep the Peace and Security Council fully and continuously informed of their activities and ensure that these activities are closely harmonized and coordinated with the activities of the Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Council shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, also keep the Regional Mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its activities.
4. In order to ensure close harmonization and coordination and facilitate regular exchange of information, the Chairperson of the Commission shall convene periodic meetings, but at least once a year, with the Chief Executives and/or the officials in charge of peace and security within the Regional Mechanisms.
5. The Chairperson of the Commission shall take the necessary measures, where appropriate, to ensure the full involvement of Regional Mechanisms in the establishment and effective functioning of the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force.
6. Regional Mechanisms shall be invited to participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that question is being addressed by a Regional Mechanism is of special interest to that Organization.
7. The Chairperson of the Commission shall be invited to participate in meetings and deliberations of Regional Mechanisms.
8. In order to strengthen coordination and cooperation, the Commission shall establish liaison offices to the Regional Mechanisms. The Regional Mechanisms shall be encouraged to establish liaison offices to the Commission.
9. On the basis of the above provisions, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation shall be concluded between the Commission and the Regional Mechanisms.

ARTICLE 17

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.
2. Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions' activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. The Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission shall maintain close and continued interaction with the United Nations Security Council, its African members, as well as with the Secretary-General, including holding periodic meetings and regular consultations on questions of peace, security and stability in Africa.
4. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant international organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. Such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council on issues of common interest, if the latter considers that the efficient discharge of its responsibilities does so require.

ARTICLE 18

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PAN AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

1. The Mechanism shall maintain close working relations with the PanAfrican Parliament in furtherance of peace, security and stability in Africa.
2. The Peace and Security Council shall, whenever so requested by the Pan African Parliament, submit, through the Chairperson of the Commission, reports to the Pan-African Parliament, in order to facilitate the discharge by the latter of its responsibilities relating to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.
3. The Chairperson of the Commission shall present to the Pan-African Parliament an annual report on the state of peace and security in the continent. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also take all steps required to facilitate the exercise by the Pan-African Parliament of its powers, as stipulated in Article 11 (5) of the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, as well as in Article 11 (9) in so far as it relates to the objective of promoting peace, security and stability as spelt out in Article 3 (5) of the said Protocol.

ARTICLE 19

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

The Peace and Security Council shall seek close cooperation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in all matters relevant to its objectives and mandate. The Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any information relevant to the objectives and mandate of the Peace and Security Council.

ARTICLE 20

RELATIONS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

The Peace and Security Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-based and other civil society organizations, particularly women's

organizations, to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required, such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.

ARTICLE 21

FUNDING

Peace Fund

1. In order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security, a Special Fund, to be known as the Peace Fund, shall be established. The operations of the Peace Fund shall be governed by the relevant Financial Rules and Regulations of the Union.
2. The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities.
3. The Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the Union.
4. There shall also be established, within the Peace Fund, a revolving Trust Fund. The appropriate amount of the revolving Trust Fund shall be determined by the relevant Policy Organs of the Union upon recommendation by the Peace and Security Council. Assessment of Cost of Operations and Pre-financing
5. When required, and following a decision by the relevant Policy Organs of the Union, the cost of the operations envisaged under Article 13 (3) of the present Protocol shall be assessed to Member States based on the scale of their contributions to the regular budget of the Union.
6. The States contributing contingents may be invited to bear the cost of their participation during the first three (3) months.
7. The Union shall refund the expenses incurred by the concerned contributing States within a maximum period of six (6) months and then proceed to finance the operations.

ARTICLE 22

FINAL PROVISIONS

Status of the Protocol in relation to the Cairo Declaration

1. The present Protocol shall replace the Cairo Declaration.
2. The provisions of this Protocol shall supersede the resolutions and decisions of the OAU relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, which are in conflict with the present Protocol. Signature, Ratification and Accession

3. The present Protocol shall be open for signature, ratification or accession by the Member States of the Union in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

4. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Chairperson Commission Entry into Force

5. The present Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a simple majority of the Member States of the Union. Amendments

6. Any amendment or revision of the present Protocol shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitutive Act. Depository Authority

7. This Protocol and all instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the Commission, who shall transmit certified true copies to all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposit of the instruments of ratification by the Member States and shall register it with the United Nations and any other Organization as may be decided by the Union. Adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union Durban, 9 July 2002

AU PSC

AFRICAN UNION PEACE & SECURITY COUNCIL

GUIDE TO PAPERWORK

Delegates must note that all forms of paperwork must be sent to the email ID mentioned below:

aupscxmun2026@gmail.com

The **deadline for the Position Paper will be the 6th of June, 11:59 p.m.** While there is no standard font and font size for the other committee paperworks, the Position Paperwork, being the first official document submitted by a delegation to the committee, will have to be written in Times New Roman and font size 12. The Position Paper must not exceed 7 pages.

Additionally, the Executive Board will be accepting a maximum of two pre-committee paperworks (Aside from the Position Paper) which can be communiques, directives, MoUs, or Presidential Statements. The deadline of these paperwork(s) will be the 7th of June, 11:59.

Position Paper:

Being the first formal paperwork which will be submitted by a delegation to the Executive Board, the Position Paper plays a quintessential role in setting the initial impression of themselves upon the Executive Board. A Position Paper is the amalgamation of a delegation's interpretation of the current problem/crisis/situation at hand, the extent of International Law that the particular delegation would like to use to solve the crisis with its own allotment's policies aligned and the solution to the particular problem that they would want to portray or propagate in the committee. A perfect position paper should ideally resonate with the country's (whose delegation is submitting it) diplomatic policies that they propagate, at that time period, to the international forum. The Executive Board looks forward to a comprehensive and smart usage of relevant International Law and IR analysis throughout the study guide. A Position Paper is formatted into the following sub-parts:

- 1. Statement of the Problem:** This is the part of the position paper which gives an overview of the current situation that the committee is facing, through the diplomatic purview of the country which the delegation is representing. It should ideally highlight the important aspects of the situation which the delegation wants the international forum to discuss upon. The portrayal of the situation should, again, be convenient to the country who the delegation is representing. A comprehensive linkage of relevant events should be used to arrive at the crux of the statement that this sub-section wants to portray.
- 2. The Represented Country's Policies:** This subsection should put forward the represented country's stance on the given agenda. Maintaining your country's foreign policy in this subsection is a mandatory task. This subsection should show how your country is relevant to the given agenda at hand.
- 3. Solutions Proposed by the Represented Country:** As the name suggests, this section will include the solutions proposed by the represented country in regards to the situation/crisis at hand. It is to be very well noted that the solutions should be realistic, executable keeping in mind the time period this committee is set in, and most importantly, aligning with the foreign policy of the country which the delegate is representing. It should ideally be diplomatic

in nature, even if it is inertly favouring the delegation's country's geopolitical advantage.

Delegates are encouraged to provide citations in MLA8 format. A sample position paper has been attached [here](#).

Communiqué:

A communiqué, as the name suggests, is a document of communication. Communiqués are messages from usually an allotment to another country, organisation, person or group of people. Communiqués can be bilateral (between two countries) or multilateral. They are meant to facilitate dialogue with relevant actors in a crisis so that delegates can take action in regards to the various crises presented to them in committee. A communiqué needs to be well worded, sufficiently detailed and most importantly realistic enough. The Executive Board would highly appreciate the usage of communiqués to cause disruption in committee in the form of updates. Realistic and detailed communiques can come as updates, with whatever amendments that the Executive Board deems necessary. Communiqués can either be public or private with regards to confidentiality and joint or individual with regards to authoring.

1. Public Communiqués

Public Communiqués refer to communication or statements that make the contents available to the entire committee. In this case, the delegations sponsoring or carrying out the action or relaying the message are known, making sure that the origins of the action taken become public records in the committee. This is normally done by delegates who intend to publicize their line of action, diplomacy, or policies to other members of the committee. In this case, it is advised that the measures should be politically feasible, diplomatic and devoid of any international condemnation.

2. Private Communiqués

Private Communiqués are meant for use where the operations carried out need secrecy and confidentiality. It is only known to the delegate(s) initiating the action and the executive board of the committee. This type of communiqué is used where the actions need to remain confidential and are intended for secret operations, contacts with people from outside the committee, and crisis situations. This is because the actions may be politically controversial and subject to international sanctions, hence the need for approval and ratification by the executive board. Such communiques, if ratified, are given as updates in such a manner that the nature of confidentiality is maintained, furthermore forwarding the crisis nature of the committee due to suspense and suspicion between delegations.

3. Individual Communiqué

Such a Communiqué is prepared and issued by one person alone or one delegation. The content and underlying strategies within the communiqué are strictly within the purview of its author. It may involve other actors, but no one else (except the delegate writing) present in the committee should be an author of such a communique.

4. Joint Communiqué

The Joint Communiqué is prepared by two or more delegations whose interests coincide, who have identical strategies, or whose aims overlap. These communiques arise from joint consultation and indicate the common determination to succeed in an enterprise where each participant hopes to gain some advantage.

A sample Joint Private Communiqué is attached [here](#). A sample Private Communiqué is attached [here](#). A sample Public Communiqué is attached [here](#).

Presidential Statement

A presidential statement works much like a press release, however, unlike press releases, it can only be written by the official head of state of a country. If ratified, a presidential statement becomes a part of the official policy of the country. It is to be noted that a presidential statement should ideally converge with the internal and foreign policy of the country that the delegation is representing because this paperwork is essentially a formal statement from its Head of State.

A presidential statement can also be joint between the Head of State of more than one country. A sample Presidential statement may be accessed [here](#). A sample Joint Presidential Statement may be found [here](#).

Memorandum of Understanding

A MoU is a political and diplomatic statement of intent between two or more than two parties. It outlines the framework, objectives, and shared understanding of a potential partnership or collaboration without imposing strict, enforceable legal obligations under international law. Although MoUs are not legally binding under International Law, a breach of a MoU can damage a country's international reputation, diminish trust, and negatively impact broader diplomatic relations between the signing nations. Therefore, entering into a MoU without aligning to your country's foreign policy or breaching an MoU will be looked down upon by the Executive Board. A sample MoU has been attached [here](#).

Directive

A directive can be a unique shift from communiques when the situation arises after committee crisis updates. It can simply be called a responsive action in regards to a

committee crisis update. Directives can further catalyse a committee crisis and further the arc of the committee. A Directive is a document that mandates an official series of measures. Unlike a Resolution in a typical MUN committee, a Directive is more straightforward, less formal, and intended for use multiple times throughout the conference, not just at the end of discussions. A thoroughly detailed and well-considered Directive will maximise the impact of your actions, whether positive or negative. Directives must be written in a clear and concise format. These directives are essential for addressing the immediate crises the committee will encounter during the conference. A sample Private Directive may be accessed [here](#).

Action Order

An action order in an MUN is a paperwork that stands for collective action undertaken by a single nation or a group of nations. This is often seen in crisis committees as they are used for strategic planning of military attacks. Action Orders are often 'pitted' against each other and the paperwork that is more detailed and feasible is usually ratified. It is ratified by the Executive board and is oftentimes introduced as an update. A sample action order is attached [here](#).

Draft Communique

A Draft Resolution in traditional MUN procedure is a formal document that specifies a plan of action that is to be undertaken by the committee as a whole to address a crisis. A Draft Communique in the AUPSC is similar to a Draft Resolution with certain differences in format. We shall follow the same structure as a Draft Resolution with the addition of the line “Acting under Article 7 of its Protocol, the Peace and Security Council” just before the first operative clause.

The following verbatim shall be used at the start of a clause in the Draft Communique

PREAMBULATORY CLAUSES

1. Affirming	2. Alarmed by	3. Approving	4. Aware Of	5. Bearing in mind
6. Believing	7. Confident	8. Contemplating	9. Convinced	10. Declaring
11. Deeply concerned	12. Deeply conscious	13. Deeply convinced	14. Deeply disturbed	15. Deeply regretting
16. Desiring	17. Emphasising	18. Expecting	19. Express Its appreciation	20. Expressing its satisfaction
21. Fulfilling	22. Fully alarmed	23. Fully Aware	24. Fully believing	25. Further deploring
26. Further recalling	27. Guided by	28. Having adopted	29. Having considered	30. Having considered further
31. Having examined	32. Having heard	33. Having received	34. Having studied	35. Keeping in mind
36. Noting further	37. Noting with approval	38. Noting with deep concern	39. Noting with regret	40. Noting with satisfaction
41. Observing	42. Reaffirming	43. Realizing	44. Recalling	45. Recognizing
46. Referring	47. Seeking	48. Taking into account	49. Taking note	50. Welcoming

OPERATIVE CLAUSES

1. Accepts	2. Affirms	3. Approves	4. Authorizes	5. Calls
6. Calls for	7. Calls upon	8. Condemns	9. Confirms	10. Considers
11. Decides	12. Declares	13. Declares accordingly	14. Demands	15. Deplores
16. Designates	17. Determines	18. Directs	19. Emphasizes	20. Encourages
21. Endorses	22. Establishes	23. Expresses its appreciation	24. Expresses its hope	25. Further invites
26. Further proclaims	27. Further recommends	28. Further reminds	29. Further requests	30. Further resolves
31. Has resolved	32. Implores	33. Insists	34. Invites	35. Mandates
36. Notes	37. Proclaims	38. Proposes	39. Reaffirms	40. Recommends
41. Regrets	42. Rejects	43. Reminds	44. Requests	45. Resolves
46. Solemnly affirms	47. Strongly condemns	48. Strongly urges	49. Supports	50. Suggests
51. Takes Note of	52. Transmits	53. Trusts	54. Urges	55. Welcomes
56. Acknowledges	57. Appeals	58. Commends		

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