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AGENDA

Addressing the Situation in
the Middle East.

FREEZE DATE

5th June,
1967

CHAIRPERSON'S ADDRESS

“Diplomacy is the art of telling people to go to hell in such a way that they ask for directions.”

- The Winston Churchill quote that never was.

Delegates,

Welcome to the Flagship committee of X-MUN 2026, the United Nations Historic Security Council.

The year is 1967. The Middle East now stands as an elaborately arranged powder keg which has met the discourtesy of a single fiery spark. You enter this committee at an hour where diplomacy has ceased to be the “once-upon-a-time” gentle exchange of pleasantries between agreeable men in agreeable suits. You will discover that morality is something that is frequently invoked most passionately by those possessing the least intention of abiding by it (No previous incidents referenced). We therefore urge you to abandon and overcome the comforting illusion that this committee shall be governed by simplicity. It will not. To misattribute Churchill with suitable reverence, your task shall frequently involve directing other nations towards hell with such elegance that they thank you for the itinerary.

Delegating in this committee demands acuity, wily and machiavellian intellect, and above all, the ability to recognise the shift in committee before they occur (Wait for the MIDNIGHT “SOMETHING”). Throughout the committee, you shall be confronting shifting alliances, negotiations with factions that do not negotiate, and crises whose velocity and frequency this circuit has never seen. The world of 1967 is labyrinthine, combustible, and gloriously devoid of certainty. Every communiqué may provoke escalation. Every silence may invite speculation. **Every alliance may prove temporary, particularly after MIDNIGHT.** Yet it is precisely within such disorder that extraordinary diplomacy emerges.

The coveted awards will go to those delegates capable of wielding legal doctrines with precision, whether through the Charter, customary international laws, questions of anticipatory self-defence, or the infinitely entertaining ambiguities of state sovereignty. Furthermore, while we officially maintain absolute neutrality,

delegates arriving armed with Malcolm Shaw's International Law may discover that the dais develops an entirely coincidental admiration for intellectual seriousness. We cannot, of course, promise brownie points. We can merely observe that civilisation itself has historically been rather kind to those who footnote properly. Delegates, the power and crisis that is in play here is exactly what highlights and differentiates a Security Council from committees like the General Assembly (No shade intended). This will be a committee attempting to negotiate with its own worst instincts whilst maintaining decorum for the photographers outside (and inside). Whether this council preserves peace, postpones war, or simply authors history's next catastrophe in particularly eloquent prose shall depend entirely upon you.

**Until June,
Aditya Aluni and Abir Parasrampuriana,
Co-Chairpersons,
United Nations Historic Security Council,
X-MUN 2026.**

SUMMARY OF THE AGENDA

By June 1967, there was a build-up of tensions in the Middle East which had been going on for nearly two decades following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the Suez Crisis. The origins of this crisis could be traced back to the territorial disputes, refugee crises, and political animosity that emerged following the birth of Israel in 1948. Although multiple armistice agreements signed at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war had resulted in momentary ceasefires, they did not guarantee, nor did they foresee, a permanent peace between the conflicting parties. Arab nations were yet unwilling to recognize the state of Israel while the Israelis considered themselves surrounded by nations that sought to undo their existence. In the coming years of the 1950s and 60s, frequent skirmishes at borders, infiltrations by Palestinian guerillas, Israeli reprisals, and conflicts over water rights in the Jordan River continued to escalate tensions. This tension was further exacerbated by the emergence of Arab nationalism, particularly that of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who called for Arab solidarity against Israel. Syria, under the rule of the Ba'ath Party, had a unique version of socialism that was both extremely radical and fueled by anti-Zionism, frequently urging actions more extreme than those of Egypt's consideration. Jordan, on the other hand, with its Hashemite dynasty ruled by King Hussein, found itself in a tricky position because of its pro-Western attitude as well as its need to sympathize with the Arab nationalist movement due to its predominantly Palestinian population. This combination of Egyptian desire, Syrian extremism, Jordanian necessity and Palestinian desperation made it possible for the Six Day War to erupt.

The immediate crisis, the boiling point of Middle Eastern tensions, arose in May 1967, as Soviet intelligence provided erroneous information about Israel moving its forces towards the Syrian border with the intention of launching an offensive strike. As a result, Egypt moved its troops into the Sinai Peninsula and ordered the evacuation of the United Nations Emergency Force, which had been present in the region since 1957 to prevent direct contact between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. U. Thant obliged, eliminating one of the few, and one of the most prominent barriers separating the two nations. On 22 May 1967, Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli ships, thereby placing Israel under blockade and blocking its passage to the Red Sea, an action which the Israeli cabinet declared as an Act of

War. Over the following days, defense and solidarity agreements between Egypt, Jordan, and Syria created the appearance of a united Arab military front. Public rhetoric from Arab leaders became increasingly militant, with declarations emphasizing the destruction of Israel and the liberation of Palestine. The crisis was seen as a threat to the survival of the Jewish State by the Israeli leadership, rather than just a minor diplomatic issue. As time went on, the economic situation worsened because of the mobilization, and diplomacy proved futile in reopening the strait, the more it became clear to the Israeli leaders that a preemptive attack was required, rather inevitable, if Israel was to avoid a multi-front war under unfavourable conditions.

The Israeli forces executed **Operation Focus** at daybreak on 5th June 1967 with a surprise attack against the Egyptian air fields. It took the Israelis just a few hours to destroy the air force of Egypt on land, thereby gaining control of the sky. The same fate awaited the air forces of Jordan and Syria within a short while. This led to an aggressive war which lasted just six days. At the end of those six days, Israel had managed to capture the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan heights. In addition to being a military conflict, the war was also one that would have serious consequences on Arab nationalism, Palestinian nationalism, super power diplomacy, and the peace efforts of the region. In the coming months, the UN security council would have to deal with serious matters such as withdrawal of territories captured, legitimacy of pre-emptive warfare, refugees created by the conflict, and principles that would guide any future settlement of the region, all of which could not have been imagined at the time. Thus, this war would go down in history as one of the most major conflicts in the Palestinian timeline.

ABOUT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The authority exercised by the Security Council mainly comes from the United Nations Charter. The Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and officially came into force on 24 October 1945, the same date on which the Security Council came into existence. It identified the Security Council as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and assigned it the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Unlike the General Assembly, which mainly passes resolutions that are recommendatory in nature, the Security Council can adopt binding resolutions under powers granted by the Charter. According to Article 25, all member states are required to accept and carry out decisions taken by the Security Council.

The Security Council was established partly because the earlier system under the League of Nations had proved ineffective in preventing conflicts that eventually led to the Second World War. The League lacked a proper enforcement mechanism and did not include all major powers among its members, limiting its ability to act effectively. The Security Council consists of fifteen members: five permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms with attention given to fair geographical representation.

A key feature of the Security Council is the veto power held by the five permanent members. On important substantive matters, any one of these members can block a resolution, meaning such decisions can only be passed if none of the permanent members oppose them. Unlike General Assembly recommendations, Security Council decisions carry legal obligations for member states. As Article 25 of the UN Charter states, every member of the United Nations agrees to accept and implement the decisions of the Security Council.

According to the UN Charter, The Security Council has been empowered not only to investigate international disputes but also to decide whether or not any situation amounted to ‘a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression’. The Security Council, having made an investigation on the same, can call for the

settlement of such a situation by peaceful means or to suggest enforcement decision including sanctions and military measures.¹ It is on account of such a vast power the scope of Security Council's operation has widened over the years.

In the case of the Middle East, the Security Council became more actively involved after the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956 and 1967. In many instances, the Security Council became the arena in which questions of ceasefires, armistice agreements, peacekeeping and negotiations were debated and the policies were formulated. Resolution 54 of the Security Council, which called for a ceasefire was adopted by the Council and Resolution 62, which set up the framework for armistice negotiations between Israel and the Arabs, was passed following the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Following the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, when Britain, France and Israel launched an tripartite attack on Egypt, an emergency meeting was convened by the Security Council which was rendered ineffective by a British-French veto and the matter was then referred to the General Assembly by the Uniting for Peace Resolution for a withdrawal of the troops. By 1967, the Security Council had been functioning as the body through which all incidents in the region were being addressed by passage of resolutions, stationing of representatives and deployment of peacekeepers to keep a potential war under international focus.


Purposes and Functions

The core mandate of the Security Council is described in Article 24 of the UN Charter, which grants it "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Under the provisions of the UN Charter, The Security Council is provisioned not just to examine international conflicts but to make a determination regarding whether or not a situation amounts to a threat to international peace, a breach of international peace, or an act of aggression. The Security Council, after making a determination regarding the same, can make recommendations for peaceful resolutions or resort to enforcement measures including sanctions as well as military measures. It is because of such a broad power that the Security Council's scope of operation has expanded over the years.

This responsibility gives the Council exceptionally broad authority in responding to wars, invasions, interstate disputes, and situations that may threaten global stability. The functions of the Council are carried out in a step-by-step manner, which has, again, been clearly laid down in the UN Charter. According to Chapter VI, the Council can ask the disputing parties to resolve their issues by adopting such methods as negotiations, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlements. The Council itself can undertake an investigation or send special representatives. Moreover, the Secretary-General can be asked to mediate in this process. All these steps do not involve any form of compulsion and wholly rely on the cooperation of the parties involved. This, however, becomes a serious drawback in cases such as that of Arab-Israeli conflict, especially after the Khartoum Resolution of 1967, which excluded negotiation, recognition, and peace with Israel from the list of options.

Whereas measures under Chapter VI are found to be inadequate, and a “breach of peace” or “act of aggression” is detected by the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter, the Council can resort to Chapter VII, which permits the use of coercive measures. Such measures include economic sanctions, arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze, among others. In the case of the current dispute, Chapter VII measures were never applied against any party due to the political impossibility brought about by the veto power during the Cold War era, the U.S. would never impose sanctions on Israel, while the Soviet Union would never impose sanctions on the Arabs. This left the most effective instruments of enforcement of the Council essentially useless during the time span mentioned above, especially in the region around which the agenda is based.

Another crucial element of the Council's mandate that relates to the present dispute is the deployment of peacekeeping missions. While there is no explicit reference to peacekeeping in the Charter, it developed as an operational tool of the Security Council. The United Nations Emergency Force, which was sent to Egypt after the Suez Crisis of 1956, was the first of its kind in the history of the UN peacekeeping mission, thus laying down the basis for future missions. This mission was based in the Sinai Peninsula, along the border between Egypt and Israel, and succeeded in maintaining the cease-fire for more than a decade, acting as a physical buffer and preventing possible hostilities within these 2 conflicting states. The fact that the



mission was forcibly withdrawn by President Nasser in May 1967 meant that there was no barrier left to prevent an outbreak of war, and the Six Day War erupted as a direct consequence within weeks, displaying the relevance of the UNEF.

The track record of the Security Council in dealing with Arab-Israeli conflict areas shows that there is an almost repetitive case of resolutions being adopted without follow-through. The case of Resolution 194 adopted after the First Arab-Israeli War, which called for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland, can serve as an example. In the Six-Day War of 1967, the problem became more pronounced when Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights in just a few days. The Security Council met on several occasions but could not adopt a ceasefire resolution until the outcome of the war became apparent. These failures and lack of implementation of the authoritative measures of the UNSC in time was one of the greatest acts of incompetence reflected by the organization in the Middle East.

IMPORTANT ARTICLES OF THE UN CHARTER

Article 24

Provides the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of all UN member states. Article 24 lays down the basic principles of the powers and responsibilities of the Security Council.

Article 25

Provides that UN member states undertake to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the Charter regarding decisions of the Security Council. Article 25 makes decisions of the Security Council internationally binding.

Article 33

Encourages parties to settle their disputes by negotiation, mediation, inquiry, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means.

Article 34

Gives the Security Council the power to investigate any situation that might endanger international peace.

Article 36

Authorizes the Security Council to make recommendations on procedures for the peaceful adjustment of such disputes or situations.

Article 37

Deals with the power to which, when disputing states are unable to solve their differences peacefully under Article 33, it will be incumbent on them to refer the matter to the Security Council, which shall be empowered to make recommendations with respect to the terms of settlement of the dispute.

Article 39

Empowers the Security Council to take action in case it considers that a threat to peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression exists, deciding what measures need to be taken.

Article 40

Enables the Council to call upon the parties concerned to undertake provisional measures of investigation or adjustment pending the final settlement of the dispute.

Article 41

Deals with non-military measures like economic sanctions, arms embargo, diplomatic measures, and even interrupting communication. Article 42 further empowers the Security Council to take military action if the measures under Article 41 prove ineffective.

Article 43

Provides for arrangements whereby states members will furnish armed forces and other assistance to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 46

Requires plans relating to armed forces to be made with the aid of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 51

States that there is a right of natural self-defense in case of an armed attack on any member state, until the Security Council takes measures deemed to be necessary to maintain international peace and security. Article 51 is often referred to when talking about preemptive strikes and state security, especially when it comes to the Six-Day War.

Article 52

Promotes resolving local disputes peacefully through regional means before referring them fully to the Security Council.

RELEVANCE OF FREEZE DATE

The Six-Day War officially began on 5 June 1967 when Israel launched Operation Focus, a large-scale military operation directed primarily against Egyptian air bases and communication networks. The operation aimed to eliminate Egypt's air capabilities at the very start of the conflict and secure air superiority. Israeli aircraft flew at extremely low altitudes across the Mediterranean in order to avoid Egyptian radar detection and approached their targets from unexpected directions. The strikes commenced at approximately 07:45 Cairo time, a moment chosen carefully based on intelligence reports suggesting that many Egyptian pilots would be changing shifts and that a large proportion of aircraft would remain on the ground. The decision proved highly effective. Within the opening hours of the attack, approximately 286 of Egypt's nearly 420 aircraft were destroyed or disabled, severely reducing Egypt's ability to coordinate an organized military response. By around 9:00 a.m., a substantial part of the Egyptian Air Force had already been neutralized.

The consequences of these developments quickly spread beyond Egypt. Acting on inaccurate Egyptian reports claiming that Israeli attacks had been successfully repelled and that Egyptian forces were advancing, Jordan entered the conflict under its mutual defense agreement with Egypt signed on 30 May 1967. Between approximately 09:00 and 11:00 a.m., Jordanian artillery began shelling Israeli positions in Jerusalem and along the West Bank frontier. At nearly the same time, Syrian artillery opened fire on Israeli settlements in the Galilee region.

Israel responded rapidly. Around 11:00 a.m., it launched strikes against Jordanian airfields, destroying a large portion of the Royal Jordanian Air Force while the aircraft remained grounded, following a pattern similar to that used earlier against Egypt. By approximately noon, Israeli air operations had also expanded to Syrian airfields, inflicting major losses upon Syrian forces. By midday, the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria had largely been rendered ineffective, giving Israel a decisive advantage in the skies during the early stage of the war.

As fighting intensified and military operations spread closer to the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem, international concern increased rapidly. At approximately 16:00 p.m. , an emergency session of

the Security Council was convened to address the growing crisis and assess the rapidly changing situation in the region.

The freeze date of 5 June carries particular importance because it represents the moment at which the dispute transformed into a full-scale interstate conflict with potentially severe international consequences. Although Israel had achieved significant tactical successes during the opening hours of the war, the final territorial and political outcomes were still uncertain. The future of the Sinai campaign, the status of East Jerusalem, and possible large-scale operations in the West Bank and Golan Heights had not yet been determined. Furthermore, Arab states continued to possess substantial military forces on the ground, while the possibility of wider regional escalation remained a serious concern. In the broader context of the Cold War, the risk of heightened tension between the United States and the Soviet Union further increased the significance of the conflict.

As the emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council begins, delegates stand at a decisive moment in Middle Eastern history. They are not merely observers to unfolding events but actors capable of shaping future outcomes. Questions of ceasefire arrangements, diplomatic negotiations, military developments, and international pressure all remain unresolved. The responsibility of delegates extends beyond addressing the immediate violence; they must also consider the political, territorial, and humanitarian consequences that may emerge in the future. The timeline up to this point has been defined by conflict and uncertainty; now, the Security Council must determine the direction in which the region proceeds.

IMPORTANT EVENTS

1936-39 Arab Revolts

The Arab Revolt was an Arab nationalist movement of Palestinians that aimed to fight against British colonial domination and mass Jewish migration in Palestine. The uprising resulted from the years of demographic fears – Jews started immigrating massively since Hitler came to power and the number of Jews increased almost twice between 1933 and 1936. The uprising began with a general strike but soon developed into a full-scale rebellion headed by the Arab Higher Committee under the command of Amin al-Husseini. In reply, the British launched violent repression, leveling buildings, applying collective punishments, and using 20 thousand troops. They also secretly armed Jewish militias such as the Haganah and Special Night Squads commanded by Orde Wingate. As a result, the British established a precedent which would later have dramatic consequences for the future history. In 1937, Peel Commission offered a partition plan dividing Palestine territory into Arab and Jewish regions, which were offered one-third of Palestine land; Arabs refused to accept it but Zionists had doubts about it. In 1939, the revolt was suppressed causing severe losses for Palestinians, around 5000 citizens were killed, leaders deported, and Palestinian organizations were crippled to a complete extent.

In fear of the revolt and of the impending Second World War, the British produced the MacDonald White Paper, restricting Jewish immigration and purchasing of land, thus antagonizing the Zionists and paving the way for a post-war Jewish rebellion against the British presence. This revolt served as a crucial foundation for future struggles since it polarized the communities to such an extent that a rapprochement would prove impossible, destroyed the leadership of Palestinians at the most opportune time, and created patterns for future events.

1948 Arab–Israeli War

This conflict had begun via several covert operations within the British Mandate of the last few months, and marks the first acts of violence surrounding the time period of the immediate termination of the Mandate. The conflict was followed by

2 major phases - one noted as a “civil war” and one marked by cumulative interstate violence.

The major clashes among Jewish and Arab communities occurred mainly in such cities as Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, Safed, Tiberias, and between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The Jewish side relied on the Haganah, Palmach, Etzel, and Stern gang. The Arab forces included local militias, the Holy War Army (led by Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni), and the Arab Liberation Army of Fawzi al-Qawuqji conducted attacks on the Jewish lines of communication and laid siege to west Jerusalem, resulting in the Haganah (the primary Zionist paramilitary organization at the time) moving to a greater offensive strategy. This transition became institutionalized in the form of Plan Dalet, which was completed in March 1948. This plan sought to ensure that areas assigned to the Jewish state would be secured, communication links would be safeguarded, and military centers would be neutralized. In the context of these activities, Operation Nachshon was launched in April 1948 as the first large-scale offensive conducted by the Haganah, ensuring that supply lines would enter the city. The initiations carried out included Operation Harel in the hills around Jerusalem, Operation Yiftach in Upper Galilee, Operation Ben-Ami via the Acre corridor and Operation Kilshon with the withdrawal of the British from Jerusalem. On April 25, 1948, the Jews occupied Haifa through forceful means, while Jaffa was seized not long after. Already in May 1948, up to 250,000 to 300,000 Arab Palestinians had become refugees due to the war.

On 14 May 1948, by provisions of the UN Resolution 181, Israel declared independence under David Ben-Gurion. The following day, armies from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon invaded Palestine, beginning a full-scale regional war. Despite facing multiple Arab armies, Israeli forces gradually gained the advantage due to stronger organization and unified command. This was termed later as the second, interstate phase of the conflict. The Egyptian forces moved northwards through Gaza to attack Tel Aviv, while others proceeded towards Beersheba and Hebron. The Syrians were attacking via the Jordan Valley region, Meanwhile, the Iraqis were fighting near Jenin and Nablus. The Arab Legion of Transjordan was fighting near Jerusalem and its environs, thus taking control of the Jewish sector of Jerusalem on 28th May 1948. Israeli military manpower increased from about 35,000 soldiers in May 1948 to 90,000 soldiers in early 1949 due to

mass conscription and arms acquisition from abroad including the Czechs. Israeli counter-offensives also included the following: Operation Dani, whereby Lydda and Ramla were taken; Operation Dekel, whereby Nazareth and the area of Lower Galilee were seized; Operation Yoav, during which Egyptians were defeated in the Negev region, and Beersheba was captured.

The war ended in 1949 with Israeli victory and armistice agreements that expanded Israeli territory beyond the borders proposed in the UN Partition Plan. Although ceasefires were signed, no permanent peace settlement was reached, leaving deep hostility and unresolved territorial disputes that would shape future Arab–Israeli conflicts.

The Tel Mutilla Incident

The Tel Mutilla incident was a military clash that occurred in May 1951 between Israeli and Syrian forces. It took place in the demilitarized zone of Tel Mutilla which was established after the 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreement. In early May 1951, fighting broke out when Israeli forces moved into areas around the Tel Mutilla region. Heavy fighting ensued between Israeli and Syrian armed forces. The fighting involved repeated assaults on several elevated and strategically important positions such as Tal Abi Zaidon, Shamalneh sector, and in the Southern Triangle of the demilitarized zone.

Lavon Affair

The Lavon Affair was a covert Israeli intelligence campaign, known as Operation Susannah, that took place in Egypt during the summer of 1954, wherein Israeli military intelligence agents used Egyptian Jewish operatives to bomb American and British institutions in Cairo and Alexandria in order to frame the Egyptian nationalists in an attempt to destabilize Nasser's government and make it seem ineffective in its job to maintain order in the country. This particular plan proved to be a complete disaster; the whole operation was revealed, operatives were arrested, others were even executed, and a political scandal ensued regarding who authorized the mission as Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon denied his part in the mission. The importance of the incident goes far beyond the fact that this particular mission was a failure. This was the first clear display regarding how Israel used

false flag terrorism against its allies in the West to create a favorable political climate and consequently destroyed all relations with Egypt, mostly as there were indications that the latter might have been willing to reach some kind of compromise.

Gaza Raid

The Gaza Raid conducted on February 28, 1955, was an extensive Israeli military raid against Egyptian military positions in the Gaza Strip which resulted in the deaths of 38 Egyptian soldiers as a response to the attacks made on Israeli citizens by the Fedayeen guerrillas operating from Egyptian-occupied areas of the Gaza Strip. Whereas the raid was justified by Israel as retaliation, the extent of the operation (the largest Israeli military operation after the 1948 War) was shocking to all involved parties, and its ramifications went beyond the purely tactical level. Above all, the raid was a blow to Nasser's prestige, because he was still not in control of Egypt's military forces and was unable to act accordingly; thus, according to many historians, this raid was one of the factors that prompted Nasser to acquire a massive arsenal of Soviet weapons via Czechoslovakia in September 1955. The acquisition of these weapons marked the end of the monopoly on weapons' sales to the Middle Eastern states enjoyed by Western powers, and brought the USSR directly within the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Suez Crisis

The Suez Crisis emerged from rising tensions between **Egypt** and Western powers during the 1950s. Egyptian President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** had become a leading figure of Arab nationalism after opposing Western influence in the region. Tensions increased after Egypt restricted Israeli access through the **Straits of Tiran**, while Palestinian fedayeen attacks and Israeli retaliatory raids intensified along the border.

On 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalized the **Suez Canal** after the United States and Britain withdrew support for Egypt's Aswan Dam project. Britain and France, fearing loss of influence and strategic control, secretly coordinated with Israel to

attack Egypt. Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October 1956, after which British and French forces intervened under the pretext of protecting the canal.


Although the invasion achieved rapid military success, international pressure—especially from the **United States** and the **Soviet Union**—forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw. The crisis greatly increased Nasser's popularity across the Arab world and strengthened Arab nationalism, while also demonstrating the declining influence of Britain and France in Middle Eastern affairs.

Jordan Headwater Diversion Plan

The Jordan Headwater Diversion Plan was an Arab initiative launched in the mid-1960s aimed at diverting the upper tributaries of the Jordan River away from Israel in order to reduce Israel's access to water resources. The issue originated from Israel's completion of the National Water Carrier Project in 1964, a large infrastructure system designed to transport water from the Sea of Galilee to central and southern Israel. In response, Arab leaders met at the Arab League Summit in Cairo in January 1964, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and approved a counter-plan. The proposal aimed to divert two major tributaries feeding the Jordan River, Hasbani River to the Litani River in Lebanon and the Banias River to Yarmouk River. Israel viewed the project not as a purely economic issue but as a direct strategic challenge. Beginning in March 1965, Israeli artillery and aircraft repeatedly attacked construction sites and engineering equipment associated with the diversion project.

Samu Raid

The **Samu Raid** was a military operation carried out by Israeli armed forces on 13 November 1966 against the village of **As-Samu**. The immediate cause of the raid was a **landmine explosion on 11 November 1966** near the Israeli border, which killed **three Israeli soldiers** and wounded several others. Israeli intelligence suspected Palestinian guerrillas associated with **Fatah** who had crossed Jordanian territory and planted the mines. In response, Israel launched **Operation Shredder**, deploying around **3,000 troops**, supported by tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and



aircraft. Israeli forces entered Samu with the stated objective of destroying infrastructure believed to support guerrilla activity.

Jordanian forces, including units of the **Arab Legion's successor forces**, attempted to resist the Israeli advance. Fighting broke out between Israeli and Jordanian troops, leading to casualties on both sides.

TIMELINE

1920–1947: The British Mandate for Palestine was established following the San Remo Conference after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. Britain was tasked with administering Palestine while also implementing the Balfour Declaration, which supported the establishment of a Jewish national home. Over the next decades, increasing Jewish immigration, land purchases, and British policies triggered widespread Arab opposition, including revolts and communal violence. By the end of the mandate period, tensions between Arabs and Jews had reached extreme levels, eventually forcing Britain to transfer the Palestine issue to the United Nations.

29 November 1947: The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, commonly known as the UN Partition Plan, recommending the division of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, while Jerusalem would remain under international administration. Jewish leaders accepted the proposal despite concerns regarding borders, whereas Arab states and Palestinian Arab leaders rejected it entirely, arguing that it violated the rights of the Arab majority population and unfairly allocated territory to the Jewish minority.

15 May 1948 - 10 March 1949: The First Arab–Israeli War began immediately after Israel declared independence on 14 May 1948. Armies from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon invaded the former mandate territory. Although the Arab states initially expected a rapid victory, Israel managed to consolidate and expand its military control. The war resulted in the creation and survival of the State of Israel, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in what became known as the Nakba, and the signing of separate armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states. However, no permanent peace settlement was achieved, leaving the region deeply unstable.

29 October – 7 November 1956 : The **Suez Crisis** erupted after Egyptian President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** nationalized the Suez Canal. Britain, France, and Israel secretly coordinated a military invasion of Egypt. Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, while Britain and France intervened under the pretext of securing the canal. Although militarily successful, the invasion faced intense diplomatic pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union, forcing all invading

forces to withdraw. The crisis greatly strengthened Nasser's popularity and accelerated the rise of Arab nationalism across the Middle East.

8 March 1957: Following the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, the **United Nations Emergency Force** was deployed along the Egypt–Israel border and in Gaza to act as a buffer force. During the following years, Cold War competition increasingly shaped Middle Eastern politics, as the Soviet Union expanded military and economic ties with Arab states such as Egypt and Syria, while the United States gradually deepened strategic cooperation with Israel.

28 May 1964: The **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) was established in Cairo during an Arab League summit. Although initially dependent upon Arab governments, the PLO became the first major organization claiming to represent Palestinian national identity and aspirations. It aimed to coordinate Palestinian political and armed resistance against Israel and gradually became a major actor in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

1 January 1965: Fatah's military wing, Al-Asifa, launched its first significant guerrilla operation against Israel by attempting to sabotage the Israeli National Water Carrier system in Galilee near the Eilabun pipeline. Although the operation itself achieved limited military success, it symbolized the beginning of sustained Palestinian guerrilla warfare and cross-border sabotage operations directed against Israeli infrastructure and territory.

13 March 1965: Israel launched retaliatory strikes against Syrian-backed Jordan River diversion projects in the Baniyas region of the Golan Heights. Syria and other Arab states had attempted to divert water sources feeding into Israel's National Water Carrier system, which Israel regarded as a direct threat to its economic and strategic survival. Israeli artillery and aerial bombardments repeatedly targeted engineering positions and construction equipment over the following months, eventually forcing the abandonment of the project by August 1965.

11 November 1965: Rising border tensions continued as Palestinian guerrilla infiltration and retaliatory Israeli operations increased throughout the region. Armed clashes along the Syrian and Jordanian borders became more frequent, while both Arab and Israeli media intensified hostile rhetoric. These incidents

contributed to a growing atmosphere of militarization and instability that steadily pushed the region toward open conflict.

23 February 1966: Political instability within **Syria** culminated in a radical Ba'athist coup that brought a more militant leadership to power. The new Syrian government strongly supported Palestinian guerrilla operations against Israel and adopted an increasingly confrontational military posture. This hardened Syria's stance in regional politics and intensified pressure on Egypt to maintain leadership of the Arab nationalist movement.

7 April 1966: Israeli and Syrian forces engaged in a series of escalating artillery exchanges along the demilitarized zones near the Syrian border. Disputes over agricultural activity, border patrols, and Palestinian guerrilla infiltration repeatedly triggered clashes. These confrontations deepened hostility between both states and prepared the groundwork for larger military escalation during the following year.

4 May 1966: A landmine exploded near Ramat Hakovesh in Israel, killing three Israeli civilians. Israeli intelligence concluded that guerrilla fighters operating from the West Bank were responsible. The incident sharply increased Israeli retaliatory readiness and strengthened arguments within Israeli leadership circles that neighboring Arab governments should be held directly responsible for cross-border attacks originating from their territory.

18 August 1966: Due to the increasing frequency of guerrilla raids and infiltration attacks, Israeli Prime Minister **Levi Eshkol** approved a broader policy of large-scale retaliation against neighboring states harboring or supporting militant activity. Israel also consolidated internal security operations under Shin Bet, reflecting growing concern that border terrorism and sabotage could escalate into wider war.

7 September 1966: Major Israeli–Syrian aerial clashes erupted following months of tension along the Syrian demilitarized zones. Israeli and Syrian aircraft engaged in intense dogfights involving Soviet-supplied Syrian MiG fighters. Israel decisively outperformed the Syrian Air Force, but the clashes humiliated Syria politically and further intensified military hostility between the two states.

4 November 1966: Egypt and Syria formally signed a mutual defense pact, strengthening military coordination between the two Arab states. The agreement established joint command structures and military advisory councils while committing Egypt to support Syria in the event of Israeli aggression. This alliance significantly increased the likelihood that future Israeli-Syrian clashes could escalate into a broader regional war involving Egypt directly.

13 November 1966: Following a landmine explosion that killed Israeli soldiers near the West Bank, the Israel Defense Forces launched a major retaliatory raid against the Jordanian village of Samu. Israeli armor, infantry, and aircraft participated in the operation, causing severe infrastructure destruction and significant casualties. The raid embarrassed **King Hussein**, exposed Jordanian military weakness, and intensified domestic political pressure upon the Jordanian monarchy.

25 November 1966: The **United Nations Security Council** adopted Resolution 228 condemning Israel's large-scale military operation at Samu. The resolution declared such reprisals incompatible with the principles of sovereignty and regional stability under the UN Charter, reflecting growing international concern regarding escalating violence in the Middle East.

7 April 1967: One of the largest Israeli–Syrian aerial battles before the war took place over the Golan Heights. Israeli aircraft shot down several Syrian MiG-21 fighters, with combat extending close to Damascus itself. The incident severely humiliated Syria and intensified demands for Egyptian military support under the Egypt–Syria defense pact.

13 May 1967: The Soviet Union falsely informed Egypt that Israel had massed troops along the Syrian border and was preparing to invade Syria. Although Egyptian intelligence reports questioned the accuracy of the Soviet claims, Nasser chose to respond aggressively in order to preserve his credibility as the leading defender of Arab nationalism.

14 May 1967: Egypt began large-scale mobilization of troops into the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian armored divisions, infantry formations, and military

equipment rapidly moved toward the Israeli border, while Arab public opinion celebrated the deployment as preparation for confrontation with Israel.

16 May 1967: Egypt formally demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai and Gaza. Secretary-General **U. Thant** complied with the request, removing the buffer force that had separated Egyptian and Israeli troops since 1957. The withdrawal dramatically increased the risk of direct military confrontation.

22 May 1967: Egypt announced the closure of the **Straits of Tiran** to Israeli shipping and vessels carrying strategic materials to Israel. Because the straits provided Israel's only maritime access to the Red Sea and Asian trade routes, Israel considered the blockade an act of war.


25–26 May 1967: Arab military coordination intensified as Egypt continued reinforcing Sinai while public speeches across the Arab world became increasingly militant. Israeli leadership simultaneously debated whether to launch a preemptive strike or continue pursuing diplomatic solutions through international mediation.

30 May 1967: Jordan officially joined Egypt in a military alliance agreement, placing Jordanian armed forces under Egyptian command. Iraqi troops also began moving toward Jordanian territory. The agreement created the appearance of a united Arab military front surrounding Israel from multiple directions.

1 June 1967: Israel formed a national unity government amid growing fears of imminent war. **Moshe Dayan** was appointed Defense Minister, strengthening support for decisive military action within the Israeli cabinet and military leadership.

4 June 1967: Israeli political and military leaders finalized plans for a preemptive strike against Egypt and neighboring Arab states. Israeli intelligence concluded that delaying military action would allow Arab armies to strengthen their preparedness and potentially coordinate a large-scale invasion.

5 June 1967: Israel launched **Operation Focus**, a massive surprise attack against Egyptian airfields and military infrastructure, beginning the Six-Day War. Within hours, much of the Egyptian Air Force had been destroyed on the ground, allowing



Israel to gain overwhelming air superiority and rapidly expand military operations across Sinai, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

The United Nations Security Council convenes in an emergency session at New York at 16:00 p.m.

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

Post WW1 - The British Mandate

The origins of the Arab-Jew conflict of ideology started from the very liberation of the Arab States from the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War 1. The Palestinians had faith in the Great Britain, whom they believed had “promised them independence, via a series of letters (The Hussein-McMahon correspondence) exchanged in 1915–1916 during World War I between Hussein ibn Ali, emir of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt. However, by 1916, France, Russia and Great Britain had signed the Sykes-Picot agreement, according to which, inter alia, the bulk of Palestine was to be internationalized.

The first mandate facilitating proper classification of modern-day Palestinian territories was formed as a result of the **Balfour declaration in 1917**, a formal statement issued by the British Foreign Secretary, expressing support for the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. Following the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and the end of the First World War, this was formally announced as international law by the Allied Powers at the **San Remo Conference 1920**, and thus the respective regions were governed by the British Administration, under the **British Mandate for Palestine**, from the year of 1920 to 1948. During this time, British authorities facilitated Jewish immigration, land acquisition, and the development of intricate institutional structures and executive bodies like the **Vaad Leumi** (internal governing body of the Yishuv), enabling the Jewish community to build a proto-state administration within the mandate. However, there was no central sovereign body, nor any equivalent centralized political institution established by the British for the Arab population.

Thus, this caused a heavy reliance on the fragmented local leadership, mostly among the Palestine Arab Congress, Muslim-Christian associations, and the Arab Executive, with prominent families like the Husseinis and Nashashibis holding traditional rivalries; this imbalance of power caused increased tensions, particularly as demographic shifts and land transfers intensified Arab concerns over possible displacement and loss of political control. The influx of over 18,000 Jewish settlers between 1919 and 1921 and the land purchases made in 1921 by the Jewish National Fund also resulted in the displacement of Arab peasants (fellahin), and

caused stronger Arab resistance which was expressed across region. Limitations under successive white papers like the **Passfield White Paper 1930**, and **Macdonald White paper 1939**, which proposed restrictions on immigration and land transfers in response to Palestinian concerns, failed to be consistently implemented within necessary reforms. Eventually, the Arab population had to rise in revolt in response to the overwhelming political, social and demographic incompetence within the British Mandate.

At the San Remo Conference, on 25th April, 1920, the **British Mandate** for Palestine was granted to Britain, although it was never formally part of the British Empire. The mandate became officially operative on September 29, 1923. This arrangement was formalized by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, via the **San Remo Agreement** presenting the mandates as a temporary system to prepare the regions for self-government. The **Cairo Conference of 1921** was a crucial moment in shaping British policy in the Middle East after World War I. Convened by British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill, it brought together key officials to address the growing cost and instability of direct rule in the region. The conference resulted in a shift toward indirect governance, where Britain would install and support friendly Arab rulers rather than govern directly. This led to the establishment of Faisal as king of Iraq and Abdullah as ruler of Transjordan. The **Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922** served as the constitutional and legal foundation for British governance in Palestine. Importantly, it formalized Britain's responsibility to implement the Balfour Declaration, thereby embedding support for a Jewish national home within the legal system.

The Order-in-Council became a key instrument through which British authority—and the tensions it generated—was exercised. In an attempt to introduce a degree of representative governance, the British proposed the creation of a **Legislative Council in Palestine in 1922**. The council was intended to include both elected and appointed members from Arab and Jewish communities, but real power would remain with the British High Commissioner. Arab leaders rejected the proposal outright, arguing that it did not grant genuine self-government and failed to address their primary concerns. Their refusal to participate led to the collapse of the plan, highlighting the deep mistrust between the Arab population and the British authorities. In 1922, Britain unilaterally declared **Egypt** an independent kingdom, ending its formal protectorate status. However, this independence was largely nominal, as Britain retained control over critical areas such as defense, foreign

relations, communications, and the security of the **Suez Canal**. King Fuad I was installed as the monarch.

Post British Mandate

The Great Syrian Revolt was the most significant anti-colonial uprising against French mandate rule in the interwar Middle East. It began in 1925 in the Druze region under the leadership of Sultan al-Atrash and quickly spread to major cities including Damascus and Aleppo. The revolt initially achieved notable success, but later the French responded with overwhelming force, deploying large troop reinforcements, heavy artillery, and aerial bombardment, including the destruction of parts of Damascus. In **1931** the **Arab Executive**, which had served as the main political body representing Palestinian Arabs since the early mandate period, gradually lost influence due to internal divisions, lack of effective leadership, and British refusal to grant it real authority; its collapse left the Arab population politically fragmented and weakened their ability to present a united front against British and Zionist policies.

After the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany, increasing persecution of Jews led to a significant wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine; this intensified demographic changes, increased land purchases, and heightened Arab fears of displacement, contributing to growing tensions between the two communities. In **1936**, Arab leaders came together to form the **Arab Higher Committee** in order to present a united front. It was led by Haj Amin al-Husayni and aimed to coordinate protests, strikes, and political actions. This was important because earlier Arab leadership had been divided, but now there was a more organized effort to oppose British policies and Jewish immigration, which soon led into the larger Arab Revolt.

In **November 1947**, Arab gunmen ambushed Jewish buses near Petah Tikva, killing and injuring several passengers in what came to be known as the **Fajja Bus Attacks**. In **February 1948**, the Haganah carried out a bombing operation against the Semiramis Hotel in Jerusalem, believing it was being used as an Arab militia command center. However, faulty intelligence meant the attack caused significant civilian casualties, including women and children.

Creation of Israel

In April 1948, as the May 15 withdrawal of British forces from Palestine drew near, David Ben Gurion organized an offensive to turn the tide and secure the area allotted to the Jewish state as well as the road to Jerusalem (the latter through a campaign known as Operation Nachshon). The **Hadassah convoy massacre** took place on April 13, 1948, when a convoy, escorted by Haganah militia, bringing medical and military supplies and personnel to Hadassah Hospital was ambushed by Arab forces. The **Israeli Declaration of Independence**, formally the **Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel** was proclaimed at the Tel Aviv Museum on 14 May 1948 (5 Iyar 5708), at the end of the civil war phase and beginning of the Arab–Israeli War of the 1948 Palestine war, by the Va'ad Leumi led by David Ben-Gurion, who later became the first Prime Minister of Israel. The following day, the armies of **Egypt, Transjordan (Jordan), Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon** invaded and attacked the Jewish paramilitaries, carrying out a decision that the Arab League had made weeks before. Armed conflict began resulting in the First Arab-Israeli War.

On 15 May, Egyptian units crossed the Sinai border and advanced toward the southern coastal plain, initially advancing into towns such as Majdal and fighting for control of Isdud. **President Shukri al-Quwatli** of Syria had approved the offensive under significant domestic pressure, which involved few senior military officers in the planning. Syria's campaign largely took place on the northern front, where its troops crossed into Galilee and targeted towns near **Lake Tiberias**. Iraq had sent several thousand troops to the central sector. The Iraqi government largely aimed to show it was a regional power, though its leaders also hoped the war would unify the population and divert attention from domestic political tensions. Iraqi units advanced toward **Jenin** and **Nablus** but struggled to win ground. Lebanon, which was largely limited by internal divisions and a weak military, played a marginal role, as its small army conducted **limited incursions** near the **northern frontier** but largely avoided large engagements. Lebanese political leaders feared that full-scale involvement might destabilise their fragile sectarian balance, which was already strained by the arrival of Palestinian refugees and the fact that tensions had risen between **Christian and Muslim communities**. Gains from the civil war that had allowed Israel to protect the Jewish communities

in Jerusalem were threatened by Arab advances, and on **May 28 the Jewish quarter** of Jerusalem's Old City was taken by Transjordan's armed forces (the Arab Legion) and left in rubble.

Despite attempts by the Arab Legion to block Israeli supply lines to west Jerusalem, the paramilitaries managed to hold Arab forces from advancing west beyond the Old City leading them to construct an alternative route, known as the "Burma Road", to supply the city. Egyptian forces had surrounded the Negev and the Jewish communities within it, which in the UN partition plan had been assigned to Israel. Ben-Gurion, now Israel's prime minister, struggled to bring the paramilitaries under the unified command of the IDF. It was only during the first truce (June 11–July 8) that he was successfully able to do so. When the *Altalena*, a vessel carrying arms on behalf of the Irgun, attempted to come ashore and unload in June 1948, Ben-Gurion ordered it to be stopped. The IDF fired on the vessel, and in the gunfight that ensued, 16 Irgun fighters and 3 soldiers of the IDF were killed. During the period of the truce, Israel received new arms from **Czechoslovakia**, and it experienced an increase in manpower with an influx of immigration of Jews from and volunteers from abroad. The 28-day truce ended on July 8, and the Arab forces were overwhelmed by the Israelis in the north. The IDF marched towards Jerusalem, occupying the cities of **Lod** and **Ramla**. The surrender of **Nazareth** was achieved with little resistance.


A second truce went into effect on July 18, which largely held for three months. A peace plan proposed in September by Greve Folke Bernadotte, a mediator appointed by the United Nations, offered the Negev to the Arab side of the partition, although the plan was collectively rejected by all sides. On October 15, after Egyptians fired on an Israeli convoy, the IDF launched a campaign, Operation Yoav, that allowed Israel to regain access to the Negev. Two weeks later, under Operation Hiram pushed the Arab forces outside of Galilee. A final push on Egyptian forces in the south (Operation Horev) took place at the end of December, and on January 7 a cease-fire went into effect.

1956-1967

During this period, the Middle East experienced numerous separate and sporadic clashes between the Israeli and the Arab militaries. Following the Suez Crisis, the prestige of Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, increased manifold, despite its military defeat. Israel, not gaining the freedom to use the Suez Canal, kept its shipping rights through the Strait of Tiran. The UNEF deployment made the Egypt-Israel border significantly calmer than before 1956. For several years major Egyptian-sponsored infiltrations declined sharply. The period saw increased activity from Palestinian resistance groups, often operating under the patronage of various Arab states. Fatah under Arafat conducted an increasingly large number of cross-border raids. These groups engaged in frequent raids into Israeli territory, creating a highly volatile atmosphere. The relationship between Israel and Syria on account of the demilitarized zones, soured significantly. Both viewed these lands as their sovereign territory, creating repeated military skirmishes. Many attacks originated from Syria, though some also came through Jordan and Lebanon.

Syria's government increasingly encouraged such activity. Palestinian refugees or armed groups frequently crossed into Israeli territory from Jordan, Syria, or occasionally Lebanon. Israeli retaliations typically included commando raids against villages which were believed to be sheltering the infiltrators. During the early 1960s, the strategic rivalry expanded beyond military confrontations and entered the sphere of resources and infrastructure. Water became one of the most conflicted subjects, with the National Water Projects leading to the Jordan Headwater Diversion Plan. At roughly the same time, Palestinian nationalism entered a new phase. In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization was created with the goal of representing Palestinian interests. Alongside it emerged independent guerrilla organizations, most notably Fatah under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. These groups increasingly conducted cross-border operations against Israel. The years 1965 and 1966 witnessed a growing number of military incidents between Israel and Syria. There was repeated exchange of fire between the military patrols of these two countries. Political instability within Arab states further contributed to the deteriorating situation. Syria experienced a series of coups throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1958 Syria joined Egypt in forming the United Arab Republic, but the union collapsed in 1961. In 1963 the

Ba'ath Party seized power in Syria, and another coup in 1966 brought to power a more radical leadership strongly committed to confrontation with Israel. Syrian leaders increasingly supported Palestinian guerrilla activity and adopted more aggressive policies toward Israel.



IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS FOR REFERENCE

HUSSEIN MACMOHAN CORRESPONDENCE (1915-16)

Although not a formal agreement, and not honoured by the British later on, this was the first major “last straw” which enabled the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine, and ignited the dedicated Arab revolts. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence was a series of letters exchanged between July 14, 1915 and March 10, 1916, between Hussein ibn Ali, emir of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt. In general terms, the correspondence effectively traded British support of an independent Arab state for Arab assistance in opposing the Ottoman Empire. The outbreak of the war changed the situation of the Arab Governance greatly: the Ottoman Empire and Germany signed a secret alliance treaty on 2 August 1914, and on the same day public mobilisation was announced. On November 1, 1914, the Minister of War, sent a letter to Hussein, in which Britain pledged to guarantee the independence, freedom, and rights of the Sharif’s authority against external aggressions, especially the Ottomans, and claimed to support the Hijaz Arabs. Al-Sharif expressed his inability to sever relations with the Ottomans immediately.

Throughout that period, McMahon was in contact with the Secretary of State for Foreign Relations Sir Edward Gray. Gray was representing His Majesty’s Government, and in the end, he became responsible for the correspondence. Hussein viewed McMahon's correspondence to him as a strong indication that Palestine would be handed up to Palestinians once the war was over. Later, the British government disputed this view. They claimed that any land definitions were simply estimates, and that a map created at the time excluded Palestine from the area that would be returned to the Arabs.

BALFOUR DECLARATION

The Balfour Declaration was a recorded statement of British support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” It was made in a letter dated November 2, 1917, from Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lionel Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild (of Tring), a leader of the Anglo-Jewish community. The declaration specifically stipulated that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” The document, however, said nothing of the political or national rights of these communities and did not refer to them by name. Although issued through the continued efforts of Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, Zionist leaders in London, fell short of the expectations of the Zionists, who had asked for the reconstitution of Palestine as “the Jewish national home”.

TREATY OF LAUSEANNE (July 24 1923)

This was the final treaty concluding World War I. It was signed by representatives of Turkey (successor to the Ottoman Empire) on one side and by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) on the other. The treaty was signed at Lausanne, Switzerland, after a seven-month conference. By replacing the earlier, unratified Treaty of Sèvres, Lausanne recognized the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic and, critically extinguished residual Ottoman claims over Arab territories, thereby clearing the legal path for the entrenchment of the British and French mandate systems.

Britain and France redirected their commercial and strategic focus toward mandate territories, where they exercised greater regulatory freedom over trade routes, land policy, and resource extraction. This contributed to the integration of a colonial economic portfolio. Simultaneously, the integration of mandate economies into imperial trade networks prioritized export-oriented agriculture and infrastructural development aligned with colonial interests, rather than subsistence stability. As a result, marginalized groups, like the fellahin farmers and the fragmented Kurdish population were not only economically sidelined but also politically excluded,

creating a cumulative sense of dispossession that contributed directly to rising unrest and mobilization in the interwar period.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

The Mandate for Palestine was a League of Nations mandate for British administration of the territories of Palestine and Transjordan, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, which determined the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, per the decision of the British government in November 1917. The mandate was assigned to Britain by the San Remo conference in April 1920, after France's concession in the 1918 Clemenceau–Lloyd George Agreement of the previously agreed "international administration" of Palestine under the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Transjordan was added to the mandate after the Arab Kingdom in Damascus was toppled by the French in the Franco-Syrian War. Civil administration began in Palestine and Transjordan in July 1920 and April 1921, respectively, and the mandate was in force from 29 September 1923 to 15 May 1948 and to 25 May 1946 respectively.

The mandate document was based on Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations of 28 June 1919 and the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers' San Remo Resolution of 25 April 1920. The objective of the mandates over former territories of Ottoman Empire was to provide "administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone". The border between Palestine and Transjordan was agreed in the final mandate document, and the approximate northern border with the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon was agreed in the Paulet–Newcombe Agreement of 23 December 1920.

In Palestine, the Mandate required Britain to put into effect the Balfour Declaration's "national home for the Jewish people" without prejudicing the rights of the existing non-Jewish population living there; this requirement and others, however, would not apply to the separate Arab emirate to be established in Transjordan. The British controlled Palestine for almost three decades, overseeing a succession of protests, riots and revolts between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab

communities. During the Mandate, the area saw the rise of two nationalist movements: Zionism among the Jews and Palestinian, Arab or Syrian nationalism among the Palestinian Arabs. Intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine ultimately produced the 1936–1939 Arab revolt and the 1944–1948 Jewish insurgency.

HAAVARA AGREEMENT

The Haavara Agreement, signed in 1933 between Nazi Germany and the Zionist Federation of Germany, was a controversial and pragmatic solution that allowed for the emigration of German Jews to Palestine amidst escalating persecution. This agreement facilitated the transfer of Jewish assets to Palestine through the purchase of German goods, providing economic benefits to both Nazi Germany and the Jewish Yishuv (community) in Palestine. While it enabled around 50,000 Jews to escape Nazi oppression and contributed to the growth of the Jewish community in Palestine, the Haavara Agreement also sparked significant ethical debates.

Understanding the historical, political, and social context surrounding the Haavara Agreement is crucial for a comprehensive assessment of its significance. In 1933, German Jews faced escalating restrictions on their rights and increasing violence under the Nazi regime, and for many, emigration was the only option to escape further persecution. Simultaneously, the Zionist movement in Palestine was striving to build a Jewish homeland, and Jewish emigration was a key element in this effort. This agreement emerged as a controversial intersection of these two contexts, with both parties, Nazi Germany and the Zionists, pursuing their own, often conflicting, goals. From a historical perspective, the Haavara Agreement represents a unique episode in Jewish-German relations, occurring at a critical juncture when Jews in Germany faced growing existential threats, and the Zionist movement was gaining momentum in Palestine. Politically, the agreement demonstrates the complexities of *realpolitik*, where ideological differences were set aside for practical gains. Socially, it highlights the internal divisions within Jewish communities, with some seeing the agreement as a necessary evil to save lives, while others viewed it as a moral compromise.

PEEL COMMISSION REPORT

The Peel Commission was a British royal commission established in 1936 to investigate escalating tensions and conflicts between Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine, which had been under British control since 1922. Tasked with finding a solution to this conflict, the commission conducted hearings for six months and produced a report in 1937. The report suggested the partition of Palestine into two separate states, one for Jews and one for Arabs, with a neutral zone under British administration, an early proposal of what would later be recognized as a two-state solution.

The commission found that both communities were seeking independence, but they held deep-seated concerns about each other's aspirations and demographics, with Arabs fearing the Jewish population would dominate. The proposal also recommended the relocation of populations between the two proposed states. While the British Parliament supported the recommendation, both communities reacted differently: the Jewish population was divided, and Arab leaders outright rejected the plan. Ultimately, the Peel Commission's recommendations were set aside, but they laid the groundwork for future discussions on the governance and territorial division of Palestine, culminating in the eventual establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

MORRISON-GRADY PLAN (31st July, 1946)

A plan for the partition of Palestine, drawn up by an expert committee led by British Deputy PM Herbert Morrison and American diplomat Henry Grady. The committee was established following the British rejection of the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations. The committee recommended that Palestine be divided into four cantons, two under direct British control (including Jerusalem), and one Jewish and one Arab canton. The cantons were to constitute a federation under a British high commissioner. The committee also recommended that land sale restrictions be abolished in the Jewish canton, which will also receive 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe within a year. The plan was rejected by both the

Jewish and Arab communities, leading Britain to turn to the United Nations and to the establishment of UNSCOP.

UNGA RESOLUTION 181

On November 29, 1947, the UNGA passed Resolution 181, calling for the partition of historic Palestine, which had been ruled by the British since the end of World War I under a mandate endorsed by the League of Nations in 1923, into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Partition Plan allocated approximately 55% of the land of historic Palestine to the Jewish state and just 42% to the Arab state. The city of Jerusalem was to be placed under international administration. At the time, Arabs comprised about 67% of the population of Palestine, while Jews made up only about 33%, many of whom were recent immigrants from Europe. Although they were allocated more than half the area of historic Palestine under the Partition Plan, Jews only owned about 7% of the land in 1947. Almost immediately after the plan was approved, violence broke out between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Zionists. Not long afterward, Zionist paramilitary groups began to expel Palestinians from their homes.

By the time that Israel declared independence in May 1948 and war broke out with neighboring Arab countries, more than 200 Palestinian towns and villages had been emptied of their inhabitants by Zionist forces under Plan Dalet (this link opens in a new window), the blueprint for expelling Palestine's Arab population that was formally adopted on March 10, 1948, by the Jewish Zionist leadership under soon-to-be Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. Expanding far beyond the proposed borders of the Jewish state delineated in the Partition Plan, by the time Israeli forces stopped their advance they were in control of 78% of historic Palestine. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194 calling for the newly created state of Israel to allow Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. It stated: "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of

international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”

1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS

The 1949 Armistice Agreements are a set of agreements signed during 1949 between Israel and neighboring Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. The agreements ended the official hostilities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and established armistice lines between Israel and the Jordanian-held West Bank, also known as the Green Line. The United Nations established supervising and reporting agencies to monitor the established armistice lines. In addition, discussions related to the armistice enforcement, led to the signing of the separate Tripartite Declaration of 1950 between the United States, Britain and France. In it, they pledged to take action within and outside the United Nations to prevent violations of the frontiers or armistice lines. It also outlined their commitment to peace and stability in the area, their opposition to the use or threat of force, and reiterated their opposition to the development of an arms race. The areas under Israeli control, as set by the agreements, encompassed about 78% of mandatory Palestine as it stood after the independence of Transjordan (now Jordan) in 1946. From the early 1920s to 1946, the British mandate of Palestine had also encompassed Transjordan, ruled under different arrangements from the area west of the Jordan river. Israel inside the armistice lines composed about 18% of this larger area including Transjordan. The areas of Palestine not occupied by Israel (the Gaza Strip and West Bank) were occupied by Egypt and Jordan respectively until 1967. See the related articles Occupation of the Gaza Strip by Egypt and Occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem by Jordan.

The armistice agreements were intended to serve only as interim agreements until replaced by permanent peace treaties. However, no peace treaties were actually signed until decades later. The armistice agreements, except for the one with Lebanon, were clear (at Arab insistence) that they were not creating permanent or *de jure* borders. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement stated "The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of

either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question." The Jordanian-Israeli agreement stated: "... no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either Party hereto in the peaceful settlement of the Palestine questions, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations" (Art. II.2), "The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto." (Art. VI.9). These lines held until the very war that this committee is facing.

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF 1950

The Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was a joint statement issued by the United States, United Kingdom, and France on May 25, 1950, to guarantee the territorial borders and armistice lines established after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. It also sought to regulate the regional arms race. The declaration's primary goal was to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict, maintain regional stability, and prevent any Soviet penetration into the Middle East. The three Western powers pledged to take immediate action, both within and outside the United Nations, against any state in the Middle East that violated established frontiers or armistice lines.

The United States, Britain, and France agreed to carefully control the sale of weapons to the region. Arms were only to be supplied to Arab states and Israel for legitimate self-defense and internal security, and in quantities that would not precipitate an arms race. The declaration was crafted largely in response to the conclusion of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. To coordinate the arms sales policy mandated by the declaration, the three powers established the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC) in 1952. Ultimately, the declaration proved difficult to enforce. Anglo-French and American policies often diverged, making the enforcement of the arms embargo inconsistent. The pact effectively collapsed with the outbreak of the 1956 Suez Crisis, which revealed the inability of the three powers to maintain a unified policy in the region.

PALESTINE COVENANT OF 1964

The Palestine Covenant of 1964 was the founding manifesto of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Adopted on May 28th, 1964, in East Jerusalem, it defined Palestine as an indivisible Arab homeland and asserted that the boundaries of Palestine were those of the former British Mandate. May 28, 1964, in East Jerusalem, it defined Palestinian national identity, set the objective of liberating the entirety of Palestine, and aimed for the dismantling of Israel. Drafted by Ahmad Shukeiri, the charter established the PLO as a revolutionary entity to mobilize the Palestinian people for the liberation of their homeland. It established that Palestinian identity belonged to those Arab citizens who normally resided in Palestine until 1947, as well as their descendants. The covenant rejected the UN partition of Palestine and declared the creation of the State of Israel to be "entirely illegal".

EGYPT-JORDAN DEFENSE PACT (1967)

The Egypt-Jordan Defense Pact of 1967 was a mutual defense treaty signed on May 30, 1967, by Jordan's King Hussein and Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The agreement stipulated that an attack on either nation would be considered an attack on both, and placed the Jordanian military under Egyptian command. This five-year pact was a major escalation leading to the 1967 Six-Day War. It united the Arab coalition alongside Syria and later Iraq, following escalating tensions and Egypt's blockade of the Straits of Tiran.

REGIONS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT

Golan Heights

The Golan Heights refers to the volcanic plateau that is found between southern Syria, northern Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. Situated at the elevated altitude, the Golan Heights have played a critical role in history for being of great strategic importance as a result of their high altitude, fertile agricultural lands and the water sources that feed the Jordan rivers. The people living in this region consisted of Sunni Muslims, Circassians, Turkmen, Christians, and mostly Druzes in the northern villages as they constituted the majority in the area. Being part of different empires, the Golan belonged to Roman, Byzantine, Arab caliphates, Ottoman, and finally French mandates in Syria.

During the rule of the Ottomans, the area was sparsely populated and rural. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed following World War I, the Golan became part of the French mandate for Syria. The borders between Palestine and Syria were established during the 1920s, when the discussions between the British and the French concluded that the Golan would remain within Syria, and the eastern shore of the Lake of Tiberias would be under British mandatory Palestine. These borders would become of great significance in future. During the mandate period and the rise of Zionism, the Golan Heights' proximity to Jewish settlements in northern Palestine gave it heightened military and political importance. There have been some attempts by the Zionist organization for the inclusion of parts of Golan in the Mandatory Palestine based on water requirements, but such attempts have failed. The emergence of the State of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli war resulted in Syria becoming one of the Arab belligerents.

The Israel-Syria Armistice Agreements of 1949 set up various DMZs on the borders between Israel and Syria, especially along the northeastern coast of Lake Tiberias and Hula Valley. Nevertheless, these agreements left some of these zones in dispute in terms of their sovereignty. Israel claimed that the DMZs were an integral part of its sovereign territory, although subject to security considerations. Syria, on the other hand, insisted that these zones be regarded as disputed

territories. In essence, this has always been a continuing bone of contention. During the decade of the 1950s and through the first half of the 1960s, the Golan Heights became one of the most heavily militarized borders in the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Artillery in the heights would often shell the Jewish kibbutzes in Hula Valley and Lake Tiberias.

Syria was afforded a great military strategic advantage through the terrain, enabling observation and shelling of northern Israel. Water politics further exacerbated tension; the construction of the National Water Carrier project by Israel, beginning in the 1950s, which involved pumping of water from the Sea of Galilee to Israel's center and south, greatly alarmed Syria along with other Arab nations. This resulted in Syria's support for schemes of water diversion of the Jordan River's headwaters in order to prevent Israel from receiving them. For their part, Israel saw such actions as an existential threat and often attacked the works in progress on the part of Syria. Politically, Syria suffered a number of coups from 1949 to 1963 and became increasingly radical with regard to its Arab nationalist politics. With the advent of the Ba'ath Party in 1963, Syria became more pan-Arabic, anti-Zionist and hostile toward Israel. Syrian political leaders actively supported cross-border operations against Israel conducted by groups such as Fatah.

During the Cold War period, Syria became the Soviet ally and received tanks, airplanes, artillery and training from the latter. Cooperation with Egypt was intensified within the framework of Arab nationalism. Israeli military planners increasingly viewed the Syrian positions on the Golan Heights as intolerable security threats.

By the 5th of June 1967, the Golan Heights stood as a heavily fortified Syrian military zone, central to disputes over borders, water, guerrilla warfare, and regional power politics. The area represented both a symbol of Arab resistance and a major Israeli security concern.

West Bank and East Jerusalem

The West Bank, which is found to be located west of the Jordan River, had at one time been part of the larger geographical area known as Palestine and housed some of the most important religious sites of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The major cities within this area were those of Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Bethlehem, Jericho, Jenin, Ramallah, and Tulkarm. East Jerusalem alone was an extremely important religious place because of the existence of the Old City, which included places like the Temple Mount, Western Wall, Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and Al-Aqsa Mosque. It has for long been under different Islamic rule before falling into the hands of the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century. Under the Ottoman Empire, the people in this region were primarily Arab-speaking Muslims together with some Arabs and Jews in certain areas such as Jerusalem and Hebron. The wave of Zionist immigration to Palestine reached its peak in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century when a British Mandate was implemented after the First World War. Immigration and nationalist sentiment on the part of Jewish communities created tensions between them and the native Arab Palestinians. Violence intensified under the British Mandate regime, especially during the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. In 1947, the United Nations proposed to divide Palestine into two autonomous states – one for Jews and another for Arabs, with Jerusalem as an international city under a corpus separatum system. While Jewish representatives agreed to the proposal, their Arab counterparts refused, considering the proposal an infringement of their rights.

Following the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, war broke out between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries. As a result of the war, the Arab Legion of Jordan gained possession of East Jerusalem and the areas west of Jordan, which were later called the West Bank. There were violent battles in Jerusalem, thus leading to a division of the city; while West Jerusalem fell to Israel's hands, East Jerusalem became Jordanian.

The 1949 Armistice Agreements established the Green Line, which separated Israel from the Jordanian-controlled West Bank. Jordan formally annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1950, granting citizenship to many Palestinian Arabs residing there. This annexation received limited international recognition but integrated the territory administratively and politically into the Hashemite

Kingdom of Jordan. The war of 1948 brought huge demographic shifts. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees left their homes or were forcefully removed from territories which became Israel. Many refugees established themselves in the West Bank and East Jerusalem area, leading to a marked increase in the number of Palestinians and putting considerable pressure on resources. Refugee camps run by the UNRWA became an integral part of the territory. Jewish inhabitants of the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem and other areas occupied by Jordan were forced out of those territories. Jewish holy places in East Jerusalem were no longer accessible to Israeli Jews after the war of 1948.

Despite significant efforts to integrate the West Bank into Jordan politically and economically, the national sentiments of Palestinians grew. Conflicts arose as a result of the clash between national aspirations of Palestinians and political authority of Jordan. East Jerusalem was one of the most conflict-prone parts of the region. Jordan administered the Islamic holy sites through the Hashemite custodianship, while Israel declared West Jerusalem its capital. Both sides regarded Jerusalem as central to their national identity.

During the period spanning the 1950s and 1960s, the West Bank border experienced infiltration, clashes, Israeli counterattacks, and increasing militarization. Attacks by Palestinian fedayeen groups occurred against Israel, and Israel undertook counterattacks against alleged guerrilla strongholds and Jordanian forces. One of the notable events during that period was the attack carried out by Israel against the Palestinian village of Samu in 1966, resulting in heavy casualties. With the emergence of the PLO in 1964, and the activities of groups such as Fatah, political tensions were exacerbated. The guerrilla activities of Palestinians against Israel from Jordan led to Jordan being in a dilemma, having to balance the nationalistic pressures from Arabs and the threat of retaliation from Israel.

By 5th of June 1967, the West Bank and East Jerusalem areas were under Jordanian sovereignty, but they were politically volatile and vulnerable.

Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip

The Sinai Peninsula is a large desert area that lies between Africa and Asia, bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the west by the Gulf of Suez,

and on the east by the Gulf of Aqaba. Being an important link between Egypt and the Levant, Sinai was strategically significant due to its immense military significance. Ownership of the Sinai would determine access to the Suez Canal, the shipping routes through the Red Sea, and the border of Israel. The Gaza Strip is a small area located at the Mediterranean coast and bounded by Egypt and Israel, which historically has been a part of Palestine. Until 1948, the Gaza Strip has housed a mostly Arab Muslim population as well as Christians in smaller numbers. Gaza was the main center of commerce.

Sinai and Gaza have been under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and later under British influence. Before the formation of Israel in 1948, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian control, although technically a part of Mandatory Palestine. The situation changed dramatically after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, when Egyptian troops took control of the Gaza Strip. Unlike Jordan in the West Bank, Egypt did not formally annex Gaza. Instead, the territory remained under Egyptian military administration.

This war was responsible for massive demographic changes. Many Palestinian refugees migrated from southern Palestine to Gaza as refugees in great numbers, resulting in rapid population growth. Refugee camps became overcrowded and impoverished, and Gaza emerged as one of the most crowded and poor areas in terms of refugees. UNRWA had to work more in the area. Gaza's economic situation worsened due to overcrowding, high unemployment rate, and restrictions on movement. The refugee problem contributed to radical political sentiments against Israel. Gaza became an important base for Palestinian fedayeen operations.

During the first years of the 1950s, Palestinians who were operating from Gaza attacked Israelis in a series of infiltration campaigns. As a result, Israelis made several punitive operations against Gaza and Egyptian military installations. Such events made relations between Egypt and Israel hostile. Egypt became an important base of Arab nationalism after the 1952 revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser was not in favor of Israel and believed in pan-Arabism. Egypt began providing aid to the Palestinians' struggle and strengthened military cooperation with Syria and other Arab nations.

Sinai came to play an important geopolitical role during the Suez Crisis. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, a joint operation between Great Britain,

France, and Israel was made against Egypt. The attack by Israel took place in October 1956 and led to the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza. One of the justifications for the attack by Israel was the end of fedayeen raids and opening access to Israeli ships to the Straits of Tiran. Following strong pressures from both the US and the USSR, Israel eventually agreed to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza in 1957. After the withdrawal, United Nations Emergency Forces were sent to Sinai and Gaza in order to keep Egyptian and Israeli forces separated.

The issue of control over the Straits of Tiran became very important. It could be assumed that access through the straits to the port of Eilat was considered an essential strategic point by Israel. One of the reasons for the 1956 war was the blockade of Israeli ships at the Straits of Tiran by Egypt. During the 1960s, Egypt increased its military presence in Sinai with the help of significant arms supplies from the Soviet Union. At the same time, there was increased Palestinian guerrilla activity in the region. The larger Arab Cold War, characterized by competition between conservative monarchies and revolutionist Arab nationalist states, also influenced Egyptian foreign policy in the region.

Tensions mounted dramatically in May of 1967. After receiving information from the Soviet Union about Israeli troop movements in Syria, Egypt brought its troops to Sinai. Nasser demanded that the UN Emergency Forces leave the area, and they were obliged to do so. Egypt began to re-arm Sinai heavily. On May 22, 1967, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli vessels. For the Arabs, it was a victory, but for the Israelis, it was considered an act of war.

As of 5 June 1967, Sinai had become the main staging ground for Egyptian military deployments against Israel, while Gaza remained a densely populated and politically radicalized territory under Egyptian administration, central to the Palestinian refugee crisis and guerrilla conflict. Together, Sinai and Gaza formed the southern front of the escalating Arab-Israeli confrontation that culminated in the Six-Day War.

KEY ACTORS IN THE CONFLICT

THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The State of Israel was established on 14 May 1948, after the end of the British Mandate for Palestine and the declaration of independence by David Ben-Gurion. Almost immediately, Israel was invaded by neighboring Arab states, including Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, which sparked the First Arab-Israeli War. Although Israel survived the war and expanded beyond the borders originally suggested in the 1947 UN Partition Plan, the conflict left the country in a state of constant insecurity. Israeli leaders believed that the surrounding Arab governments would never accept a Jewish state and would try to destroy it whenever they had the chance. As a result, security concerns became central to Israel's political identity, military planning, and foreign policy from the start. During the 1950s, Israel experienced repeated infiltrations and attacks from Palestinian fedayeen groups operating mainly from Gaza, the West Bank, and neighboring Arab areas. These attacks included sabotage operations, ambushes, and assaults on border settlements. In response, Israel adopted a policy of strong military retaliation, arguing that deterrence was crucial for survival. This approach led to a cycle of escalating violence between Israel and the Arab states. Israeli military strategy increasingly focused on quick offensives, intelligence superiority, and preemptive actions rather than prolonged defensive warfare. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), formed in 1948 from earlier Jewish paramilitary groups like the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi, quickly became one of the most organized military institutions in the Middle East. Due to Israel's small population and limited strategic depth, military planners feared the country could not survive a drawn-out war on its own territory. Israeli military doctrine therefore stressed speed, surprise, mobility, and eliminating enemy capabilities before they could fully mobilize. These principles became the backbone of Israeli strategy by the mid-1960s.

The 1956 Suez Crisis had a significant impact on Israeli military confidence and planning ahead of the Six-Day War. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as a leading figure of Arab nationalism after nationalizing the Suez Canal and surviving the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion. Israel regarded Egypt as its

greatest regional threat, especially because Egypt supported fedayeen activities from Gaza and blocked Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran.

During the Suez Crisis, Israeli forces quickly captured the Sinai Peninsula, showcasing the effectiveness of Israeli armored warfare and air-ground coordination. Battles at Rafah, Abu Ageila, and Sharm el-Sheikh demonstrated that Israel could defeat larger Arab forces through superior planning and mobility. Though international pressure forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai, Israeli commanders became convinced that offensive warfare and surprise attacks were vital for national survival.

Tensions along Israel's borders continued to rise in the early 1960s. Syria supported Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel and became involved in disputes over water diversion projects along the Jordan River. Israel responded with repeated artillery shelling and air strikes against Syrian positions in the Golan Heights. Border clashes became more frequent, especially in demilitarized zones near the Sea of Galilee. Israeli society began to feel that a larger regional war was becoming inevitable.

In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in Cairo with the backing of Arab governments. Around the same time, Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat, launched its first guerrilla attacks against Israel. Although many initial operations caused limited damage, they raised Israeli concerns about coordinated Arab hostility. Israeli leaders increasingly stated that neighboring Arab governments would be responsible for guerrilla attacks that originated from their territories.

By 1966 and early 1967, the Syrian front had become especially threatening. On 7 April 1967, a major aerial battle erupted following disputes over Israeli agricultural activities near the Syrian border. Israeli aircraft shot down several Syrian MiG-21 fighter jets, some of which crashed close to Damascus. This incident embarrassed Syria and increased pressure on Egypt to defend its ally.

In May 1967, the Soviet Union wrongly informed Egypt that Israel was preparing a major attack against Syria. Despite the misinformation, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser mobilized troops into the Sinai Peninsula. Shortly thereafter, Egypt called for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which

had been in Sinai since the Suez Crisis. Secretary-General U Thant complied, removing the buffer between Egypt and Israel.

On 22 May 1967, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, cutting off Israel's access to the Red Sea. Israel viewed this as an act of war. Military cooperation among Arab nations intensified rapidly afterward, with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq coordinating military agreements and troop movements. Israeli leaders worried that delay would only bolster Arab military readiness and heighten the threat of a coordinated multi-front invasion.

Within Israel, military commanders strongly supported a preemptive strike. Intelligence estimates indicated that if Arab air forces struck first, Israeli cities and airfields could sustain severe damage. Given that Israel relied heavily on its air force for survival, Israeli planners believed that air superiority needed to be secured right at the start of any war. Major General Motti Hod, the Israeli Air Force commander, was mainly responsible for this mission, which led to what became known as Operation Focus.

Operation Focus, initiated on the morning of 5 June 1967, was one of the most well-planned air operations in recent military history. The Israeli Air Force had trained for years to execute rapid low-altitude strikes designed to destroy enemy aircraft before they could take off. Israeli pilots practiced flying just a few meters above the ground to evade radar detection, while ground crews developed techniques to rearm and refuel aircraft in minutes, allowing for multiple attack waves in a single morning.

At around 7:45 a.m. local time, nearly the entire Israeli Air Force—about 180 aircraft—took off at the same time. Only a few fighters stayed back to defend Israeli airspace. The Israeli planes flew west over the Mediterranean before sharply turning toward Egypt at very low altitude to avoid detection by Egyptian radar systems. The attack's timing was carefully chosen since many Egyptian commanders were commuting to work and air patrols were minimal.

The first wave focused on Egyptian air bases across Sinai and the Nile Delta. Israeli aircraft targeted runways using specialized bombs designed to create craters, preventing aircraft from taking off. Soon after, Israeli fighters and bombers

attacked parked planes, hangars, fuel depots, radar stations, and communication centers.

Major Egyptian air bases that were attacked included:

1. Cairo West Air Base
2. Inshas Air Base
3. Fayid Air Base,
4. Abu Suwayr Air Base,
5. El Arish Air Base
6. Bir Gifgafa Air Base
7. Jebel Libni Air Base
8. Hurghada Air Base
9. Beni Suef Air Base
10. Luxor Air Base
11. Almaza Air Base near Cairo.

Within the first few hours, Egypt's air force was devastated. Hundreds of Egyptian aircraft—including MiG-21s, MiG-19s, MiG-17s, Sukhoi bombers, and Tu-16s—were destroyed, mostly while still on the ground. Israeli pilots reported seeing rows of burning aircraft across Egyptian runways. Egyptian command and communication systems collapsed quickly, leading to confusion among military leaders.

After crippling Egypt's air force, Israeli aircraft turned to Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi bases later that same day. Jordanian airfields like Amman and Mafraq were bombed, destroying much of Jordan's small air force. Syrian bases, including Damascus, Dmeyr, and Marj Ruhayyil, experienced heavy bombing, while Iraqi aircraft at H-3 air base in western Iraq were also targeted.

By the end of 5 June, Israel had obtained almost total air superiority over the Middle East. Egypt lost most of its air force in a single day, while Syria and Jordan also faced significant losses. Israeli aircraft then provided close support for ground forces advancing across Sinai, the West Bank, and later the Golan Heights with minimal effective resistance from Arab air forces. Operation Focus resulted in

nearly complete destruction of the Arab Air Force and allowed Israel free movement on all fronts.

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (EGYPT)

When King Farouk was overthrown in 1952, the Arab Republic of Egypt under the Free Officers Movement underwent a major political transition. Although Muhammad Naguib initially took center stage as the face of the revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser slowly rose to power. By 1954, he had gained effective control of the country and the nation. Nasser proceeded to lead Egypt in its journey to become a stronghold for Arab nationalism, anti-colonialism, and regional leadership.

His campaign in favor of political and military union between Arab countries and a pact against Western influences, in addition to opposing Israel, whom most Arabs considered a colonial creation, increased his popularity tremendously in the 1950s. Broadcasts from Radio Cairo in which Nasser spoke of Arab unity, the battle against imperial forces, and liberation of Palestine greatly influenced nationalist movements throughout the Arab world and contributed to the creation of what has come to be known as Nasserism. Egypt gradually positioned itself as the natural leader of the Arab world, particularly after colonial powers such as Britain and France had reduced their influence in the Middle East.

One of the first conflicts to break out between Egypt and Israel occurred as a result of Palestinian fedayeen activities originating from the Gaza Strip, which remained under Egyptian administration following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Over the course of the early 1950s, numerous armed Palestinian groups entered Israeli territory and committed acts of sabotage, infiltration, and terrorism in Israeli settlements, and retaliatory operations by Israel became increasingly harsh. These activities further inflamed hostility between the two countries and convinced Egyptians that Israel posed a serious threat. In 1956, the crisis known as the Suez War occurred. Tensions in the region already existed with Egypt's blockade on Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran and support of anti-Israeli fedayeen. Nasser, after seizing the Suez Canal in July 1956, angered Britain and France; a

secret military alliance was established between Britain, France, and Israel to attack Egypt. The Sinai was invaded on 29 October 1956 by Israeli troops under Operation Kadesh. Their troops penetrated deep into Sinai using armor and airborne divisions, conquering a variety of strategic locations along the way, including Abu Ageila, Rafah, Gaza, and Sharm el-Sheikh. Egyptian forces suffered great losses, and their dispatches were poorly coordinated, rendering them unable to counter the advance.

Although Egypt was militarily defeated, the crisis strengthened Nasser's position. With political pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Israel withdrew and, across the Arab world, Nasser was hailed as a triumphant hero who had dared to defy the imperial powers and survived, further cementing Egypt's prestige as well as Nasser's popularity. UNEF was deployed in Sinai and Gaza to mediate between the two countries and the Straits of Tiran were reopened to Israeli shipping. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was significant development of Egyptian military power thanks to the influx of massive quantities of Soviet weaponry purchased by Nasser under the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms deal, initiating close military ties between the Soviet Union and Egypt. The Egyptian forces gained MiG jet fighters, Il-28 bombers, tanks such as the T-34 and T-54, artillery, and advanced radar equipment. Soviet advisors also aided in training and modernization.

By 1965, Egypt possessed the most sizable armed forces in the Arab world. However, structural flaws greatly weakened Egyptian military power; professionalism was sacrificed in favor of loyalty within the officer corps, centralization weakened flexibility, coordination was poor between different fighting arms, and communications were weak. Many trained officers were busy in North Yemen defending republican forces, to which Egypt had lent support beginning in 1962.

The Yemen intervention proved incredibly expensive to Egypt, both in terms of resources and manpower. It left thousands of Egyptian soldiers in North Yemen until 1967, when the fighting subsided, thus hindering readiness for a direct conflict with Israel.

Throughout this time, disputes with Israel continued and increased. One key issue involved water sources from the Jordan River. The National Water Carrier, which would divert water away from the region toward Israel, was a major concern for Arab states including Egypt, and they therefore backed Syria's attempts to prevent the project. Israeli retaliation consisted of artillery fire and air strikes against Syrian engineering works on the Jordan River headwaters, resulting in frequent skirmishes. In 1964, Egypt founded the PLO on the premise of coordinating the Palestinian struggle. This was done so that various Arab governments could control the direction of Palestinian nationalism. At this point Palestinian guerrilla groups such as Fatah began their operations on Israeli soil with increased frequency. Although they were not directly controlled by Egyptian authorities, many Israeli leaders placed the blame on surrounding Arab states.

As border tensions with Israel became critical and disputes with Syria escalated, it became essential for Egypt to act in order to maintain its position as leader of the Arab world. Nasser feared that failure to support Syria would damage his image as leader of Arab nationalism and increase Israel's regional influence. The first major skirmish was an aerial engagement between the Israeli and Syrian Air Forces on 7 April 1967, during which several Syrian jets were shot down in and around the Golan Heights, with some falling near Damascus. This was viewed as a humiliation and further pressured Nasser to act under the defense pact signed with Syria in 1966. The crisis escalated from 13 May 1967, when the Soviet Union announced that the Israeli army had concentrated large numbers of troops on the Syrian border in preparation for an invasion. Although there was little evidence for this assertion, Nasser was reluctant to appear weak in the eyes of the Arab world and began preparing for war almost immediately. Egyptian armored divisions and ground troops massed in the Sinai Desert in massive numbers on 14 May, while tanks and artillery poured across Sinai toward the border. Egyptian radio and public broadcasts intensified the atmosphere of an approaching war.

On 16 May, Egypt demanded the removal of UNEF from Sinai and Gaza, which the UN agreed to in the interest of avoiding bloodshed despite concerns that it would remove an important buffer between the two countries. Egyptian forces rapidly occupied former UNEF positions on 18 May. Most decisive was Nasser's action on 22 May. Egypt formally closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping,

preventing Israel from using the Gulf of Aqaba and restricting access to the Red Sea, thereby affecting trade through the port of Eilat. Ever since 1957, Israel had repeatedly stated that any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war. During the final days of May 1967, Egyptian rhetoric became increasingly militant. Public statements emphasized Arab unity and the coming confrontation with Israel. On 26 May, Nasser declared that if war came, the objective would be the destruction of Israel. Although some historians debate whether Egypt was actually preparing for immediate offensive war, Israeli leaders interpreted Egyptian actions as evidence of an existential threat.

Arab military coordination also intensified rapidly. On 30 May 1967, King Hussein of Jordan traveled to Cairo and signed a defense agreement with Egypt, placing Jordanian forces under Egyptian command in the event of war. Iraqi troops soon began moving toward Jordan as part of the broader Arab military buildup. Across the Arab world, public demonstrations and media broadcasts predicted an imminent battle against Israel. Inside Egypt, military preparations accelerated throughout late May and early June. Egyptian air bases in Sinai and the Nile Delta were placed on alert, while troop deployments continued along the border. However, serious organizational weaknesses remained unresolved. Egyptian command structures were often confused, intelligence assessments inconsistent, and military coordination incomplete. Many Egyptian aircraft were parked in exposed positions on airfields without hardened shelters, making them highly vulnerable to surprise attack.

By early June 1967, Egypt possessed numerical military advantages in several categories, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Nevertheless, Israeli intelligence closely monitored Egyptian deployments and concluded that delay would only strengthen Arab readiness further. Israeli military leaders increasingly argued that survival depended upon striking first, particularly against the Egyptian Air Force, which was considered the backbone of Arab military power.

On the morning of 5 June 1967, before most Egyptian aircraft had become airborne, Israel launched Operation Focus, a massive surprise air assault targeting Egyptian air bases across Sinai and the Nile Delta. Within hours, much of Egypt's air force had been destroyed on the ground, marking the beginning of the Six-Day War.

THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Syria was arguably the most aggressive country to increase tension with Israel in the years leading up to the Six Day War. Having experienced several coups and periods of political unrest throughout the 1950s, Syria adopted radical Arab nationalist and Ba'athist ideologies, openly anti-Western and anti-Israeli. Thus, there was growing hostility to Israel and western influence in the Arab world. By early 1960s the Syrian leaders supported Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel and encouraged armed conflict as a way to end the Israeli-Arab war.

One of the primary issues leading to an increased conflict was the disputes in the demilitarized zones, as was decreed in the Armistice Agreement of 1949. The nations claimed that each was infringing the terms of the agreement, particularly concerning Israeli agricultural work in a border region on a Syrian demilitarized zone. Syria shelled Israeli farming communities with artillery on the Golan Heights, and Israel responded with artillery bombardment in return. The high elevation provided Syria with a significant strategic advantage and made the Golan Heights one of the most dangerous borders in the world.

Also, a huge dispute between the two nations concerning the usage of water sources had begun. Syria strongly opposed Israel's plan of National Water Carrier, a diversion project for the headwaters of the Jordan River. Israel launched retaliatory air attacks and artillery bombardment on Syrian engineering facilities and construction works. Such armed clashes gradually increased hostility between Syria and Israel throughout 1965 and 1966. Moreover, Syria has also become a major supporter of Palestinian guerrilla organization. Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel triggered widespread retaliation, with Israel stating Arab states responsible for attacks from their territories.

Israeli-Syrian tension reached its climax on 7 April 1967 when a land dispute in the demilitarized zone escalated into a full-blown air combat. The battle resulted in the destruction of many Syrian MiGs, two of which landed outside Damascus. Syria's defeat and humiliation led to tremendous pressure for Egypt to respond according to the bilateral treaty signed by them in 1966.

Syria played a vital role in urging Egypt to retaliate against Israel in May 1967 after news that Egyptian troops were amassing on the Israeli border. The information reported to Egypt exaggerated the scale of the Israeli army concentration near the Syrian borders and the events subsequently went rapidly out of control. Syrian political leaders made escalating violent statements demanding the liberation of Palestine.

THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

Jordan was in a more complicated position within the Israeli-Arab conflict than any other nation; king Hussein and his government were not generally as willing as their Egyptian and Syrian counterparts to engage in outright military conflict with Israel. Nonetheless, following the Arab-Israeli war, Jordan was left controlling the West Bank and East Jerusalem, putting it at the center of the Palestinian issue and removing any option for neutrality.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Jordan suffered under pressure from Palestinian groups and increasingly radical Arab states. Palestinian infiltration into Israel from the West Bank led to frequent Israeli reprisals. The most significant of these was the 13th November 1966 Samu Raid, which followed a mine explosion that had killed Israeli border guards. It destroyed much of the Jordanian village of Samu and made it obvious to all Arab nations the weakness of Jordanian defenses.

King Hussein and Jordan were facing potential isolation as radical Arab nationalism and in particular Nasser's pan-Arab rhetoric became increasingly influential, and Hussein knew that Jordan needed to be part of an Arab response to the growing threats.

As tensions increased in May 1967, Jordan finally threw its lot in with Egypt. On 30th May Hussein signed the Egypt-Syria Mutual Defense Pact in Cairo, agreeing to place Jordanian armed forces under Egyptian command, with Iraqi forces also moving to Jordan soon after. Hussein remained hesitant until the end, but pressure from home and Arab political sentiment dictated his course.

PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION

Palestinian nationalists have since 1948 pursued the goal of regaining control of the land formerly known as Palestine. After the Six-Day war this was redefined to refer to Israel. After 1948 hundreds of thousands of Palestinians found themselves as refugees and a distinct national identity grew amongst them. Palestinians also began to believe they should take the task of liberation upon themselves, rather than relying on Arab leaders.

1964 was the first real opportunity for this movement, at the Arab League Summit in Cairo where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed. The organization was at this point, however, under firm control of the Arab states, most notably Nasser.

Independently of this, smaller commando groups formed and executed sabotage and infiltration attacks in Israel; the most famous being Fatah led by Yasser Arafat, carrying out raids such as the attack on Israeli water pipelines in Galilee on 1 January 1965. Many early operations failed, causing little damage, but were symbolically significant in demonstrating Palestinian capability for prolonged conflict and encouraging an escalating cycle of Israeli raids into Arab territories such as Syria and Jordan, who came to be blamed for harboring these guerillas.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American policy on the Middle East before the Six-Day War was predominantly shaped by four main principles: contain Soviet influence; secure access to oil; ensure regional stability and maintain friendly relations with allied states. In 1948 the United States officially recognised Israel, however, the country at this time held a neutral position between the Arab states and the new nation.

This neutrality was altered with growing resentment toward Egyptian President Nasser and his pan-Arab policies. The US feared that conflict in the Middle East would inevitably draw in the Soviet Union; Egypt demonstrated this fear in 1955 when it acquired huge amounts of arms from the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia. Despite hostility to Nasser, the United States did not support direct colonial

occupation of the Middle East, shown during the Suez Crisis of 1956 when they brought severe pressure to bear on the British, French and Israelis to pull out from Egypt.

Following the crisis the United States looked toward a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem which did not entail war, therefore they encouraged a strong presence of United Nations Peacekeepers in the Sinai peninsula. This policy was accompanied with sympathy for Israel, particularly since U.S. Policy makers viewed it as the one truly stable, democratic country in a predominantly dictatorial region. By the early 1960s, military and intelligence cooperation between the United States and Israel had begun expanding. Although France remained Israel's primary weapons supplier for much of the decade, the United States increasingly provided political support and strategic communication with Israeli leaders. American officials were also deeply concerned about repeated Arab-Israeli border clashes involving Syria, Jordan, and Palestinian guerrilla groups.

As tensions escalated in May 1967, the United States attempted to avoid direct military confrontation in the region. President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration urged restraint on both sides while monitoring the rapid Egyptian military buildup in Sinai. After Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran on 22 May 1967, the United States recognized that Israel considered the blockade an act of war. However, Washington still hoped an international diplomatic solution could reopen the straits without triggering conflict.

American officials explored proposals for an international maritime coalition to challenge the blockade peacefully, but these efforts moved slowly and failed to produce immediate results. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders increasingly feared that delay would strengthen Arab military coordination and reduce Israel's strategic advantage. Although the United States warned Israel against launching unilateral military action, American leaders also privately acknowledged Israel's security concerns.

By early June 1967, the United States was attempting to balance two major priorities: preventing a regional war while also avoiding the destruction or severe weakening of Israel. When Israel launched Operation Focus on 5 June 1967, the United States was not directly involved in the attack, but Washington rapidly

became deeply engaged diplomatically as the conflict expanded across the Middle East.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union began to exert its influence over the Middle East through growing relationships with Arab nationalist government leaders, such as those in Egypt and Syria. The leaders in the USSR viewed the Middle East region as a strategically important battleground in the larger fight between Western and Soviet powers (Cold War). The Soviet Union also wanted to reduce the Western powers' influence in the region by providing support (military, financial) to various anti-colonial and nationalist movements.

A major development for the Soviet Union in the Middle East was when Egypt, on behalf of the Soviet bloc, signed a large arms deal with Czechoslovakia in 1955. The agreement allowed Egypt to obtain large amounts of newly manufactured Soviet weapons, including MiG fighter aircrafts, tanks, artillery, and other military equipment. This arms deal marked the beginning of extensive military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Egypt and significantly altered the regional balance of power. At the same time, Syria received a significant amount of military assistance from the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The Soviet Union politically supported the Arab opposition to Israel, and Soviet leaders often strongly condemned Israeli military actions at the United Nations. Soviet propaganda depicted Israel as a reactionary force with ties to the colonial power (the West), while portraying Arab Nationalist Governments as part of the broader global anti-colonial movement.

GUIDE FOR COMMITTEE PAPERWORK

General Guidelines:

All committee paperwork, unless asked otherwise by the Executive Board, will have to be submitted to the committee mail ID, unhsc.xmun2026@gmail.com.

Any violation to X-MUN 2026's plagiarism policy, detected in any of the paperworks, will lead to the cancellation of that paperwork, followed by a heavy demarcation under the discretion of the Executive Board.

The accepted forms of paperwork in X-MUN'26 UNHSC are:

1. Position Paper
2. Crisis Paper
3. Presidential Statement
4. Press Release
5. Communique
6. Memorandum of Understanding
7. Directive
8. Action Order
9. Draft Resolution

Pre-Committee Paperwork:

The Executive Board will be accepting a compulsory Position Paper and a Crisis Paper from each delegation. The deadline for the Position Paper and the Crisis Paper will be the 4th of June, 11:59 p.m. and the 6th of June, 11:59 p.m. respectively. While there is no standard font and font size for the other committee paperworks, the Position Paperwork, being the first official document submitted by a delegation to the committee, will have to be written in Times New Roman and font size 12. Both the Position Paper and the Crisis Paper must not exceed 7 pages.

Additionally, the Executive Board will be accepting a maximum of two pre-committee paperworks (Aside from the Position Paper and the Crisis Paper) which can be communiques, directives, MoUs, or Presidential Statements. The deadline of these paperwork(s) will be the 6th of June, 11:59.

Position Paper:

Being the first formal paperwork which will be submitted by a delegation to the Executive Board, the Position Paper plays a quintessential role in setting the initial impression of themselves upon the Executive Board. A Position Paper is the amalgamation of a delegation's interpretation of the current problem/crisis/situation at hand, the extent of International Law that the particular delegation would like to use to solve the crisis with its's own allotment's policies aligned and the solution to the particular problem that they would want to portray or propagate in the committee. A perfect position paper should ideally resonate with the country's (whose delegation is submitting it) diplomatic policies that they propagate, at that time period, to the international forum. The Executive Board looks forward to a comprehensive and smart usage of relevant International Law and IR analysis throughout the study guide. A Position Paper is formatted into the following sub-parts:

- 1. Statement of the Problem:** This is the part of the position paper which gives an overview of the current situation that the committee is facing, through the diplomatic purview of the country which the delegation is representing. It should ideally highlight the important aspects of the situation which the delegation wants the international forum to discuss upon. The portrayal of the situation should, again, be convenient to the country who the delegation is representing. A comprehensive linkage of relevant events should be used to arrive at the crux of the statement that this sub-section wants to portray. The Executive Board looks forward to rather unique analyses and interpretations that the represented country would advantageously and ideally portray in the real world.
- 2. The Represented Country's Policies:** This subsection should put forward the represented country's stance on the given agenda. Maintaining your country's foreign policy in this sub section is a mandatory task. This sub section should show how your country is relevant to the given agenda at

hand. Analysis of International Law and treaties is what makes this sub-section very important to the position paper. Keeping in mind the plethora of International Law, conventions and treaties that is in play in a Security Council meeting, especially one which revolves around the Middle East, the convenient portrayal of the ones which can prove to be advantageous to the represented country is the trick to writing a perfect position paper.

- 3. Solutions Proposed by the Represented Country:** As the name suggests, this section will include the solutions proposed by the represented country in regards to the situation/crises at hand. It is to be very well noted that the solutions should be realistic, executable keeping in mind the time period this committee is set in, and most importantly, aligning with the foreign policy of the country which the delegate is representing. It should ideally be diplomatic in nature, even if it is inertly favouring the delegation's country's geopolitical advantage.

Delegates are encouraged to provide citations in MLA8 format. A sample position paper has been attached [here](#).

Crisis Paper:

A crisis paper is a very unique piece of paperwork which is rarely seen in an United Nations committee. Keeping in mind the radical nature of this committee which will be reached on the days of the conference, the Executive Board will be requiring a comprehensive idea of the country's confidential and covert internal geopolitical goals. That is exactly what a crisis paper provides. The most pertinent point of difference between a position paper and a crisis paper is that a crisis paper focuses on private geopolitical and military goals and objectives rather than a public portrayal of policies that is seen in a position. The crisis paper becomes imperative for the Executive Board to further the committee's procedures and arc of events during certain unique sessions which this committee will see. There is no strict format to a crisis paper as freedom is provided to the delegates regarding how they want to portray the said ideas. The Executive Board looks forward to the most unique ideas (Nothing against the foreign policy of the country) which may cause

disruption in the committee in the form of updates that are introduced as crises for the committee to solve.

Communiqué:

A communiqué, as the name suggests, is a document of communication. Communiqués are messages from usually an allotment to another country, organisation, person or group of people. Communiqués can be bilateral (between two countries) or multilateral. They are meant to facilitate dialogue with relevant actors in a crisis so that delegates can take action in regards to the various crises presented to them in committee. A communiqué needs to be well worded, sufficiently detailed and most importantly realistic enough. The Executive Board would highly appreciate the usage of communiqués to cause disruption in committee in the form of updates. Realistic and detailed communiques can come as updates, with whatever amendments that the Executive Board deems necessary. Communiqués can either be public or private with regards to confidentiality and joint or individual with regards to authoring.

1. Public Communiqués

Public Communiqués refer to communication or statements that make the contents available to the entire committee. In this case, the delegations sponsoring or carrying out the action or relaying the message are known, making sure that the origins of the action taken become public records in the committee. This is normally done by delegates who intend to publicize their line of action, diplomacy, or policies to other members of the committee. In this case, it is advised that the measures should be politically feasible, diplomatic and devoid of any international condemnation.

2. Private Communiqués

Private Communiqués are meant for use where the operations carried out need secrecy and confidentiality. It is only known to the delegate(s) initiating the action and the executive board of the committee. This type of communiqué is used where the actions need to remain confidential and are intended for secret operations,

contacts with people from outside the committee, and crisis situations. This is because the actions may be politically controversial and subject to international sanctions, hence the need for approval and ratification by the executive board. Such communiques, if ratified, are given as updates in such a manner that the nature of confidentiality is maintained, furthermore forwarding the crisis nature of the committee due to suspense and suspicion between delegations.

3. Individual Communiqué

Such a Communiqué is prepared and issued by one person alone or one delegation. The content and underlying strategies within the communiqué are strictly within the purview of its author. It may involve other actors, but no one else (except the delegate writing) present in the committee should be an author of such a communiqué.

4. Joint Communiqué

The Joint Communiqué is prepared by two or more delegations whose interests coincide, who have identical strategies, or whose aims overlap. These communiques arise from joint consultation and indicate the common determination to succeed in an enterprise where each participant hopes to gain some advantage.

A sample Joint Private Communiqué is attached [here](#). A sample Private Communiqué is attached [here](#). A sample Public Communiqué is attached [here](#).

Presidential Statement

A presidential statement works much like a press release, however, unlike press releases, it can only be written by the official head of state of a country. If ratified, a presidential statement becomes a part of the official policy of the country. The Executive Board would look forward to the delegates who would use such paperworks as a response to any crisis, maybe even adding more realistic disruption in the process. It is to be noted that a presidential statement should ideally converge with the internal and foreign policy of the country that the

delegation is representing because this paperwork is essentially a formal statement from its Head of State.

A presidential statement can also be joint between the Head of State of more than one country. A sample Presidential statement may be accessed [here](#). A sample Joint Presidential Statement may be found [here](#).

Press Release


A press release is a document used to inform the committee aware of a certain incident or an action that has been undertaken. A press release can be single or joint. By its very nature, a press release is always public. Do note that the UNHSC Executive Board may be involving the updates as press releases, digital or verbal. A sample may be found [here](#).

Memorandum of Understanding

A MoU is a political and diplomatic statement of intent between two or more than two parties. It outlines the framework, objectives, and shared understanding of a potential partnership or collaboration without imposing strict, enforceable legal obligations under international law. Although MoUs are not legally binding under International Law, a breach of a MoU can damage a country's international reputation, diminish trust, and negatively impact broader diplomatic relations between the signing nations. Therefore, entering into a MoU without aligning to your country's foreign policy or breaching an MoU will be looked down upon by the Executive Board. A sample MoU has been attached [here](#).

Directive

A directive can be a unique shift from communiques when the situation arises after committee crisis updates. It can simply be called a responsive action in regards to a committee crisis update. Directives can further catalyse a committee crisis and further the arc of the committee. A Directive is a document that mandates an official series of measures. Unlike a Resolution in a typical MUN committee, a Directive is more straightforward, less formal, and intended for use multiple times throughout the conference, not just at the end of discussions. A thoroughly detailed and well-considered Directive will maximise the impact of your actions, whether



positive or negative. Directives must be written in a clear and concise format. These directives are essential for addressing the immediate crises the committee will encounter during the conference. A sample Private Directive may be accessed [here](#).

Action Order

Similar to a directive, an action order is indeed a responsive amalgamation of actions to a particular crisis. However, in the particular committee, Action Orders can only be drafted upon the declaration of war. Action Orders, prompts the Executive Board to carry forward the crisis situation or give a conclusion to it via the usage of updates, inspired on the ratified parts of the Action Order. Action Orders will test how well researched a delegate is with regards to his country's logistical, international and military capabilities. A sample action order is attached [here](#).

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Is Israel's declaration of war on 5th June 1967 a case of legitimate anticipatory self-defense based on the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Caroline principle, or illegitimate first use of force pursuant to Article 2(4)?
2. To what extent can Egypt's closure of the Straits of Tiran legally be interpreted as an act of aggression sufficient to justify immediate military retaliation by Israel?
3. Did the concentration of Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi forces near Israeli borders create an objectively imminent threat under customary international law, or merely a deterrent military posture?
4. Was there a violation of customary norms regarding the Principle Of Proportionality because Israel struck the operational capability of all of the Arab air forces instead of just those representing an offensive threat?
5. Could Israel reasonably claim that all avenues of negotiation, mediation or resolution through the UN had been tried before going ahead with its air campaign on 5 June 1966?
6. How far does the response of the Arab countries following the Israeli attack amount to an act of collective self-defense as provided for by the defense pacts between Arab countries?
7. Does the swift withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force destabilize the entire structure created post-Suez?

CONTACT INFORMATION

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